

Rethinking Titu Cusi Yupanqui's Negotiations with Spanish Peru
for Vilcabamba's Surrender

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ABSTRACT

In the sixteenth century, the penultimate ruler of the Inca dynasty, Titu Cusi Yupanqui, wrote his account of the Spanish conquest. *An Inca Account of the Conquest of Peru* has been hailed by historians as crucial to the understanding of the period because it was an indigenous recount of Spain's conquest yet has not been examined as what it truly is: Titu Cusi's own attempt to renegotiate himself back into the power structure of Tahuantinsuyu. This paper serves as a challenge to the current historiography on Titu Cusi's relación that questions the sincerity of the Inca's negotiations on the grounds that they were merely an attempt to stall in order to preserve the Neo-Incan state of Vilcabamba's independence. That incorrect historiography's portrayal of negotiations as a stall contains a fatalistic view of the Inca state of Vilcabamba; previous historians have seen Spanish conquest as inevitable. Instead, the negotiations must be seen as an attempt to manipulate Spanish authorities to maximize the return for Titu Cusi, politically, socially, and economically. Titu Cusi needed to use both Spanish allies and Spanish scapegoats in order to absolve himself and his father, Manco Inca, of rebelling against the Crown of Castile. The Inca manipulated Spanish concepts of nobility, religion, and descent in order to achieve his ends.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

“To cross mountains, follow the valleys, search out tenable ground, and occupy the heights. If the enemy holds the heights, do not climb up to engage them in battle.”

“All armies prefer high ground to low. And sunny places to dark.”
-Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*¹

The neo-Inca resistance state of Vilcabamba was founded at the base of the mountains in a seemingly impenetrable region of Tahuantinsuyu, also known as the Inca Empire. Early Spaniards feared the role that the altitude and gradient of the mountains could play in colonial warfare due to both the difficulty of acclimatization as well as the tactical advantages.² Some Andeans could – and did – use the mountains to roll boulders down onto unsuspecting conquistadors to transform valley pathways into death traps.³ However, after the fall of the highland fortress of Vitcos in approximately 1536, the rebel city was moved to the lowland jungle at the base of the mountains filled with disease, animals, and cannibals that ultimately proved to be harder to conquer. Just the thought of the Antisuyu – the northeast territory of the Inca Empire – filled many Spaniards and Incas with fear. Jesuit priest and knowledgeable Indian chronicler, Blas Valera said that,

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Hollywood: Simon and Brown, 2011), 207.

² For the length of this paper, the word “Spain” will refer to the territory of modern-day Spain and the term “Spaniards” will refer to people from those territories. However, Spain as a unified nation-state did not exist until the eighteenth century, long after the scope of this research.

³ Pedro Pizarro, *Relation of the Discovery and Conquest of the Kingdoms of Peru* (New York: The Cortes Society, 1921), 342.

Those who live in the Antisuyu eat human flesh, they are fiercer than tigers, have neither god nor law, nor know what virtue is. They have no idols nor likenesses of them. They worship the devil when he represents himself in the form of some animal or serpent and speaks to them. If they make a prisoner in war...and know that he is a plebeian of low rank, they quarter him and give the quarters to their friends and servants to eat or to sell in the meat market. But if he is of noble rank, the chiefs gather with their wives and children and, like ministers of the devil, strip him, tie him alive to a stake, and cut him to pieces with flint knives and razors, not so as to dismember him, but to remove the meat from the fleshiest parts, the calves, thighs, buttocks, and fleshy parts of the arms. Men, women, and children sprinkle themselves with the blood and they all devour the flesh very rapidly, without cooking it or roasting it thoroughly or even chewing it. They swallow it in mouthfuls so that the wretched victim sees himself eaten alive.⁴

Meanwhile, the Inca Titu Cusi wrote that being given up to the non-Inca inhabitants of the region, known as the Anti or Moyomoyo, to be tortured and eaten was his father's way of punishing those who "did not know how to behave themselves."⁵

The founding of Vilcabamba was the result of a falling out between the conquistador, Francisco Pizarro, and the Inca, Manco Inca, a relationship that had previously been very strong. Different sources carry different explanations for what happened between the two great leaders which will be examined at a later time.⁶ This is one reason why interpreting the events of 1536 to 1571 have proven to be very difficult for historians. Sources from the sixteenth century Andes include conquistadors, Incas, *mestizos*, priests, and politicians, to name but a few. Each one had as much vested interest in the correct framing of the narration of the conquest as Pizarro and Manco did. These accounts, known as *meritos y servicios*, could – and would – frequently be used to

⁴ Garcilaso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries of the Incas* (Austin: University of Texas Press), 33.

⁵ Titu Cusi Yupanqui, *An Inca Account of the Conquest of Peru*, trans. Ralph Bauer (Boulder: University of Colorado Press), 112.

⁶ In short, the reasons include (but are not limited to) kidnapping, disloyalty, and rape.

petition for spoils of war.⁷ Furthermore, it has been sufficiently established that these leaders were, unsurprisingly, very adept at manipulation and smooth-talking their way out of trouble. Before his siege of Cusco in 1536, Manco Inca even managed to convince a group of potential rioters that his being arrested by Spaniards would lead to them treating him more liberally in the future.⁸ Furthermore, the difficulty of obtaining unblemished sources is exacerbated by the fact that pre-Colombian Quechuas did not use a system of writing familiar to Europeans and that can be translated today. Instead, they used a system of knotted cords called *quipu* (or *khipu*) which served the purpose of counting, keeping the calendar, and communicating messages across the Andes.⁹

Historians have been intrigued by the social and political unrest in colonial Peru for quite some time. Everyone from Chile Masa to Tomás Katari to the infamous Túpac Amaru II have all been studied in great detail, many of these to be examined in detail in this paper's chapter on historiography. This fits the larger theoretical perspective of these rebel leaders as heroic which, however implicitly, makes Spaniards the villains in these narratives. Yet for all of the interest that exists in the violence of indigenous rebellions, considerably less attention is frequently given to the reconciliation of the parties. Similar to the oversimplification of indigenous agents either playing the role of traitor or resistance hero, the peace terms are too often viewed as merely an end result, like perhaps the concessions that were granted or a change in the political relationships that would characterize a historical catalyst. However, in the vein of growing historiography in Andean history that examines social mobility and Indian agency within Spanish

⁷ See Bernal Diaz del Castillo, *The True History of the Conquest of New Spain* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2012).

⁸ De la Vega, 121.

⁹ Mark Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 22.

institutions, it is increasingly necessary that the surrender or negotiations for surrender be viewed as a continual process rather than a static event.

Scholarly debate is rampant about the intentions of Manco Inca's rebellion. Was he seeking an autonomous yet submissive indigenous state? Did he rebel simply to protest the treatment he was receiving? Was it because of his pride? Or was the rebellion Manco's Inca's attempts to expel the foreign invaders from his homeland once and for all? Moreover, a consensus has not been obtained in regards to the conversion and negotiations for surrender by his sons, Sayri Túpac and Titu Cusi Yupanqui, the latter being the focus of the present research. The penultimate Inca had to use cultural cunning, political savvy, and manipulation in order to achieve his goals. Titu argued for he and his father's legitimacy of descent, of a close, personal relationship with the hero of the conquest, Francisco Pizarro, as well as finding a sympathetic ally to serve as his intermediary and vulnerable villains to serve as his scapegoats. It was a complex and difficult task to convince the monarch of Spain to not only pardon Titu Cusi's rebellion, but also to grant him labor and economic concessions on the basis of royalty after his father rebelled against Spain. Moreover, Titu not only continued to live at his father's rebel state but ratcheted up the pressure and crimes against Spaniards during his tenure.

This research attempts to bring Titu Cusi Yupanqui into the current paradigm of Andean historiography of indigenous agency. Rather than viewing rebellion as the only action of indigenous sovereignty, this work seeks to view Titu Cusi Yupanqui, Sayri Túpac, and their father, Manco Inca, as active players in their own destinies rather than as passive recipients of Spanish colonization. Whether intentional or not, historiographical trends that portray indigenous leaders as either "rebels" or "puppets" perpetuate the

antiquated viewpoint that Amerindians were incapable of intellectually undermining the European process, thus confirming their status as “brutes” or “savages.” While certainly brutal in behavior, this paper seeks to examine Titu Cusi Yupanqui’s intellectual strategies in negotiations with Spanish Peru.

Chapter II

THE HISTORICAL CONVERSATION: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE VILCABAMBA INCA

“Noteworthy is the work related to resistance and rebellion, which has produced a more complete vision of [...] political and economic discontent while elucidating indigenous actions and reactions from an understanding of indigenous culture and values.”¹⁰

-Lyman Johnson and Susan Socolow,
“Colonial Spanish South America”

Titu Cusi Yupanqui has often been overlooked in the history of the Inca. His account, *An Inca Account of the Conquest of Peru*, is frequently cited by historians and anthropologists but the works that rely on his chronicle are much more often about his family members than they are about Titu Cusi.¹¹ His father, Manco Inca, is frequently known as the Inca who sieged Cusco and created the Neo-Inca state of Vilcabamba and Vitcos. His older brother, Sayri Túpac, carries the description as the Inca who negotiated with the Spaniards and “submitted” to their authority. Even his younger brother, Túpac Amaru I, has a distinct place in history for being the last Inca despite the fact that his rule lasted for just one year. Titu Cusi, however, was ruler of a period that saw little tangible gains from either the Spaniards or the rebels at Vilcabamba. For this reason and many

¹⁰ Lyman Johnson and Susan Socolow, “Colonial Spanish South America,” *The Oxford Handbook of Latin American History* (2010), 82.

¹¹ One work that relied on Titu Cusi heavily without writing about the Inca himself is Thomas Flickema's “The Siege of Cuzco,” published in *Revista de Historia de America* in 1981. Flickema used Titu Cusi's *relación* to balance his Spanish sources in discussing Manco Inca's siege.

others, it is only recently that a sudden surge in interest about the penultimate Inca has greatly increased our understanding of his reign.

Accounts of Titu Cusi were hardly disinterested from an early stage. Colonial chroniclers often portrayed Titu Cusi in a negative or even vicious fashion, from his physical appearance to his personality and rise to power. An account written by Juan Ortiz de Matienzo, a Spanish judge who had previously served in both the *Real Audiencia* in the Dominican Republic and in New Spain, was critical despite Titu Cusi's alleged devotion and piety in front of him.¹² Matienzo portrayed Titu Cusi as a bastard and a usurper of the Inca throne, taking what was rightfully his brother Túpac Amaru I's. He did not only accuse the penultimate Inca of having violated indigenous custom and traditions, he also made a claim that would hit closer to home for Spanish readers: he alleged that Titu Cusi alone was responsible for the “violation” of the treaty signed by Sayri Túpac that was intended to secure the capitulation of all inhabitants of Vilcabamba.¹³ According to Matienzo, the “usurping” Inca was the rebel, thus granting *de facto* absolution for the rest of Vilcabamba's residents. Matienzo was also responsible, in part, for the development of the historiographical paradigm that Titu Cusi's negotiations with Spanish officials in Peru were simply a stall. He claimed that the Inca's ultimate goal throughout the discussions was the continued and acknowledged sovereignty of Vilcabamba from the Spanish crown. This would not create a so-called

¹² Kerstin Nowack, “*Las mercedes que pedía para su salida: The Vilcabamba Inca and the Spanish State, 1539-1572*,” in *New Worlds, First Nations: Native Peoples of Mesoamerica and the Andes Under Colonial Rule*, eds. David Cahill and Blanca Tovías (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 73. In John Hemming's *The Conquest of the Incas* (p. 223), it is said that there was a famous event where Titu Cusi threw himself prostrate on the ground at Matienzo's feet while weeping the first time he met the judge.

¹³ Juan de Matienzo, “Gobierno del Peru. Obra escrita en el siglo XVI por el licenciado don Juan Matienzo oidor de la Real Audiencia de Charcas,” *Publicaciones de la Sección de Historia de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras* (Buenos Aires, 1910), 193.

“state within a state” but rather trade Titu Cusi's hollow pledged vassalage to the king in return for autonomy.¹⁴

Titu Cusi Yupanqui would not get any better treatment from the royal chronicler Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa. Like Matienzo, Sarmiento was quick to label Titu Cusi as a bastard and usurper to the throne. He also named the Inca's younger brother, Túpac Amaru I, as the rightful heir due to what Sarmiento considered more noble lineage.¹⁵ To thoroughly understand Sarmiento's opinions of descent and legitimacy, however, it is worth noting that his royally commissioned account was biased by its motivations alone. This was the author's attempt to provide “Viceroy Francisco de Toledo with evidence that no legitimate heir of the Inca dynasty survived.”¹⁶ This blatantly politically motivated accusation was not the only criticism of the Inca, however. While other contributions to historiography disagree as to the role of Titu Cusi in relation to his younger brother – some claim he was acting as regent while others claim that Túpac Amaru's age made it reasonable that Titu Cusi could have claimed the throne through competence – Sarmiento's account takes it one step further and accuses Titu Cusi of having his younger brother locked away in a nunnery or an *acllawasi* to politically marginalize him.¹⁷ These early colonial chroniclers would have a huge impact on the shaping of the historiography of Titu Cusi and his negotiations with Spanish Peru.

¹⁴ Matienzo.

¹⁵ Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 38.

¹⁶ Nowack, 68.

¹⁷ Sarmiento, 213. The *acllawasi* was an institution of the Inca Empire. It was, essentially, “the house of chosen women” who were chosen for their desirable traits, including beauty. These women could function as worshippers of specific *huacas* or even as concubines for the Inca. No matter their particular job, the *acllas* were highly valued for their virginity and male presence in the house was harshly punished. This would make Túpac Amaru's presence in the house, if true, highly unusual.

Supporting the theory that Titu Cusi is often neglected in history, one of the largest and most famous works on the history of the Incas and the conquest by Pizarro, *History of the Conquest of Peru* by William Hickling Prescott, completely ignores the Inca in Peru's history despite covering a time period that covers his reign. Prescott dealt at length with Titu Cusi's more historically popular father and presented him in a positive light. He stated that he was “a man of lofty spirit and a courageous heart,” and that he “made his name a terror to the Spaniards.”¹⁸ Prescott even included Manco Inca's death, an event that coincided with the attempted murder of his son, Titu Cusi, by eulogizing the powerful Inca rebel:

The death of Manco Inca, as he was commonly called, is an event not to be silently passed over in Peruvian history; for he was the last of his race that may be said to have animated by the heroic spirit of the ancient Incas. Though placed on the throne by Pizarro, far from remaining a mere puppet in his hands, Manco soon showed that his lot was not to be cast with that of his conquerors. With the ancient institutions of his country lying a wreck around him, he yet struggled bravely, like Guatemozin [Cuatemoc], the last of the Aztecs, to uphold her tottering fortunes, or to bury his oppressors under her ruins.¹⁹

On one hand, Prescott showed admiration for a rebellious ruler who refused to submit to the authorities that had intended for him to be a “puppet” for their empire, possibly due to the persistence of the Black Legend of Spanish history. Yet on the other, Prescott's attitude helps explain why historians have frequently neglected Titu Cusi's place in history: he viewed Manco Inca as the end of the legitimate Inca dynasty. It is certainly possible that Prescott was influenced by works such as Sarmiento's who sought to argue for a lack of a legitimate Inca heir. The book was also reflective of the decidedly Eurocentric tones of the time. Rather than acknowledge that a society was developing

¹⁸ William Hickling Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Peru, with a Preliminary View of the Civilization of the Incas* (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2005), 41.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 271.

outside of the Spanish sphere of influence, Prescott portrayed the area around Vilcabamba and Vitcos as dangerous for Spaniards, a “frontier” of sorts. His work also showed how far nineteenth century historiography still needed to go when he chalked up Manco Inca's failure to the “superior science” of his Spanish adversaries and declared that the unconquerable spirit of the “young barbarian” was still admirable despite his inherently doomed attempt.

Influenced by the works of the early chroniclers, Philip Ainsworth Means wrote many works on colonial Peru in the early twentieth century. By relying on these accounts and taking them uncritically at face value, Means' works reflected much of the same sentiment as Titu Cusi's contemporaries expressed. For starters, he claimed that “Titu Cusi Yupanqui, half-brother of Sayri Túpac, wrongly seized power. He had no right to it, for he was illegitimate, and the rightful Inca was Túpac Amaru I.” He, too, claimed that Titu Cusi kept his younger brother imprisoned for decades in the *acllahuasi* (*acllawasi*) but he was simply trusting the major colonial accounts.²⁰ This over-reliance on historical works that sought to discredit the Inca not only allowed the focus of Titu Cusi's historical legacy to center around his noble or peasant lineage but also perpetuated claims made that should have been approached with an analytical eye. For example, Means wrote that it was a baptism that inspired Titu Cusi to convert to Christianity without questioning the sincerity, the timing, and the politics of the Inca's newfound piety. In fact, rather than critiquing his conversion, Means instead critiqued his behavior towards Spanish officials in Cusco, describing his actions leading up to his baptism as “displays of arrogance.”²¹ Additionally, Means showed his participation in the Hispanophile tradition of revisionism

²⁰ Philip Ainsworth Means, “The Rebellion of Tupac Amaru II, 1780-1781,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 2 (1919), 5.

²¹ Means, 5.

of the day and also a hint of ethnocentrism when he said that it was cultural deficiencies that led to the downfall of the Inca empire.²²

While the next major work about Titu Cusi, written by George Kubler, critiqued many previously unmentioned aspects of his reign, it still framed his historical legacy as a usurper.²³ Kubler further questioned Titu Cusi's noble lineage in his work, “The Neo-Inca State (1537-1572),” by questioning the lineage of his father, Manco Inca. While all of the pertinent historiography focuses on two major civil wars in early colonial Peru – one being between the Inca brothers Atahualpa and Huáscar and the other being between conquistadors Francisco Pizarro and Diego de Almagro – Kubler's work brought a third civil war to academics' attentions: between Manco Inca and Paullu Túpac.²⁴ This angle brought up little new information but the new context for Inca rebellion was a startling contrast. For example, nearly all historiography that limits “civil wars” in Peru to just the two portrays the relationship between the Spaniards, Manco Inca, and Paullu Túpac in a simplistic way: Manco Inca rebelled against the Spanish colonial administration and Paullu Túpac was chosen to replace him as the “puppet ruler” for the colonial structure. Yet Kubler framed the story as a dynamic, rotating system of alliances and wars between the rival Inca factions and rival Spanish factions.²⁵ He began the narrative by showing that Almagro recruited Manco Inca to side with him during the Spanish civil war by inviting him to live in Cusco with him. However, Paullu Túpac saw this as a threat to his own potential rule so he subverted the attempt in order to prevent a strong alliance

²² Phillip Ainsworth Means, Intro to *Relation of the Discovery and Conquest of the Kingdoms of Peru* (New York: The Cortes Society), 31.

²³ George Kubler, “The Neo-Inca State (1537-1572),” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 27 (1947), 193.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 189.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

between Almagro and Manco that would give the latter the throne.²⁶ Meanwhile, Paullu Túpac was seen as a valuable ally for the Pizarrists even though he had wavering loyalties. According to Kubler, after allying with Almagro, Paullu Túpac accepted the throne in Cusco from the Pizarrists in return for his aid against Manco Inca. It was Pizarro's hope that Paullu Túpac would crush Vilcabamba without any involvement of Spanish troops or leadership. However, this plan was temporarily put on hold as Paullu again switched sides, fighting for Almagro's faction. After a series of military blows inflicted by the Pizarrist army, Paullu Túpac was again requested to assume the throne in Cusco beside a Pizarro administration, despite the fact that he had fought against them.²⁷ This addition to Manco Inca's historiography also changed the way negotiations with Vilcabamba were approached by Kubler. He stated that it was Paullu Túpac, not Spanish authorities, that first opened negotiations with Sayri Túpac and that they stalled because of Paullu's premature death. This led the authorities to reopen negotiations in 1548 with Sayri Túpac that were now led by an Inca *coya*.²⁸ After Sayri Túpac's eventual capitulation, Titu Cusi was once again portrayed by a historian as the reason for Vilcabamba's continued existence as opposed to Spanish failures to include security and economic provisions for all Vilcabamba residents in discussions with Sayri Túpac. Kubler stated that "Titu Cusi, the eldest but illegitimate son of Manco Inca, had no intention of fulfilling the contract paid for by the Spaniards. Instead of dissolving the government of Vilcabamba, he usurped it and had himself made Inca in 1560[...] his

²⁶ Kubler, 191.

²⁷ Ibid, 192.

²⁸ Ibid, 194-5. The term *coya* is translated as "sister-wife." A *coya* was the principal wife of the Inca and their children would be considered of the "purest" lineage, a concept that will be explored later.

existence was governed by the will to resist Spanish dominion.”²⁹ While Kubler should be credited with looking for motivations for Titu Cusi's continued rebellion, his work argued for the oft-used paradigm of a rebellious indigenous leader who refused to accept submission. This was perhaps due to the Black Legend of Spanish history that sought to portray colonial Spaniards as brutal tyrants who subjected their people to such horrible treatment that they were forced to attempt to rebel.

Kubler also did not acknowledge Titu Cusi's diplomatic skills in regards to Spanish Peru. Rather, he stated that the reason why Titu Cusi was so successful and influential during his reign was due to “an impressionable and hesitant governor, Lope Garcia de Castro, of whose weaknesses Titu Cusi took full advantage.” He further diminished Titu Cusi's abilities by declaring that the Inca only dominated so many territories and enjoyed significant power because Diego de Castro sought a weak-willed policy of appeasement.³⁰ This prejudice against Amerindians, albeit unintentional, manifested itself throughout the work, like in the treatment of Titu Cusi's Christianity. Kubler gave a positive impression of Titu Cusi's years in Cusco, claiming that he learned to read, to write, and to be a Christian. However, his criticism of the Inca's piety were evident as he stated that the reason why Titu Cusi did not burn churches was due to his desire for sovereignty rather than religious respect. On a similar note, much of George Kubler's reasoning for Titu Cusi desiring sovereignty was based on his desire for a “pagan” lifestyle; he claimed that since he had two wives, it was clear that Titu Cusi did not desire to move back to Cusco where bigamy was prohibited as he did not “relish a

²⁹ Kubler, 196.

³⁰ Ibid, 196-198. It is worth reminding the reader that Kubler wrote this article on Vilcabamba in 1947; this is a time period in which leaders who can be perceived as appeasing aggressive rulers would not be viewed in a positive light.

servile and monogamous lifestyle.”³¹ Kubler's prejudice against Titu Cusi could be seen in the fact that he focused on his weight to the point where he claimed that he died because he was obese and had been exercising more than his body could handle.³² However, Kubler's work also relied too heavily on Titu Cusi's *relación* for validation and took everything he said about his father or himself to be an accurate representation of his beliefs and perceptions. He claimed that he loved and admired his father greatly and was motivated to resist following his father's example.³³ Kubler's work would not examine Titu Cusi's latent motivations nor examine the social and political functions such negotiations could entail.

The largest and all-encompassing monograph written about the Inca to date is John Hemming's 1970 work, *The Conquest of the Inca*. In Hemming's work, he discussed Vilcabamba and, by consequence, Titu Cusi at length and his work still influences the field today, including any misconceptions that he had about the Inca. He both followed the lead of previous works on Titu Cusi and challenged them at various points. Yet his chapter on Titu Cusi immediately made no qualms about on which side of Titu Cusi's historiography he fell:

Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of Vilcabamba was Titu Cusi himself. He was the sun around which the small state revolved. All that we know reveals him as a capable and conscientious ruler. He was constantly moving about his kingdom, living without undue ostentation but preserving the ceremonials traditional to his rank. He took his duties as the head of the Inca state and religion seriously and participated with enthusiasm in the various festivals that gave so much pleasure to his subjects. The proximity of Spanish Peru did not terrify him as it had Sayri-Tupac's regents. He

³¹ Kubler, 198-200.

³² Ibid, 201.

³³ Ibid, 197. Other works of Kubler, including his work on Titu Cusi's father, “A Peruvian Chief of State: Manco Inca (1515-1545),” also relied heavily on Titu Cusi's *relación* for historical facts. For more, see George Kubler, “A Peruvian Chief of State: Manco Inca (1515-1545),” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 24 (1944): 253-276.

maintained cool-headed relations with the Spaniards and was receptive to new influences from them. His prime concern was the well-being of his subjects and the preservation of his state and dynasty.³⁴

Within this paragraph, we see that Hemming viewed him as extremely powerful since Vilcabamba revolved around him. This is already in stark contrast to previous historiography that depicted the Inca as, at best, successful due to the weakness of others or, at worst, “impotent.”³⁵ In this portrayal, Titu Cusi is benevolent, thoughtful, compassionate, calm, and able. This perception was not only unique in historiography but was also contradicted within Hemming's work itself. While he was “cool-headed” and “conscientious,” he was simultaneously described as “an exuberant, emotional man who could switch from sudden anger to jovial good humour.” To support this seemingly antithetical description, Hemming cited reports of Titu Cusi's unbalanced behavior around Spanish priests ranging from good-natured humor to deep connections to sudden anger. He also cited a similar incident with a Spanish official where Titu Cusi repeatedly boasted of how many Spaniards he would kill then later dismissed it as a joke.³⁶ Yet despite his emotional threats to murder his guests, Hemming stated that “he was a thoughtful host.” It is clear that Hemming wanted to reverse the paradigm that had prevailed for centuries against the penultimate Inca and often interpreted actions in a manner polar opposite to historians that preceded him. For instance, when discussing the murder of an innocent gold prospector that had found gold on Vilcabamba's territory, Hemming was sympathetic and argued that it was perhaps a wise decision, “in the same way that President Castro had reacted in panic to the discovery of the pikes at Jauja.”³⁷

³⁴ John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas* (New York: Harcourt, 1970), 223.

³⁵ Sarmiento, 213.

³⁶ Hemming, 223.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 224.

In addition, Hemming stated that “Titu Cusi was remarkably tolerant of the Spaniards, often against the wishes of his more narrowly militant followers. The fact that he permitted Diego Rodriguez to erect a large cross and to preach at Pampaconas was an example of this lenience[...]”³⁸ This not only challenged prior accounts that portrayed him as an arrogant and violent ruler but also sought to redefine Titu Cusi's religiosity. He challenged this further when he stated that previous historiography that portrayed the Inca as “Christian by political convenience” were “not necessarily correct.” He stated that “In his *Relación* the Inca appeared genuinely convinced that his own conversion had been the Spaniards' prime objective. This impressed him, as did the sincerity and lack of greed of the missionaries, and the obvious success of the Spaniards' god in promoting their interest.”³⁹ This continuation of historians' willingness to accept Titu Cusi's *relación* at face value can be seen throughout Hemming's work.

Hemming's description of Titu Cusi was based largely on the Inca's own accounts. As previously mentioned, his research also occasionally made sources to fit his theories. In order to portray Titu Cusi as an emotional and compassionate individual, Hemming took Titu Cusi's nearly cartoonish embellishments of his behavior sincerely:

There was none of the stony reserve or inscrutability of Atahualpa about Titu Cusi. He talked openly to Rodriguez and Matienzo and even, at one point, showed Rodriguez the scars on his leg inflicted by his father's assassins. He showed obvious delight at presents Rodriguez gave him, such as 'half an arroba of crystals and pearls, and seven bracelets of silver' or 'a very good looking-glass, two necklaces of coral beads, and a paper book' or the eight yards of yellow damask that arrived from President Garcia de Castro. Nor was he above throwing himself tearfully at the feet of Judge Matienzo when they met on the bridge of Chuquichaca.⁴⁰

³⁸ Hemming, 223.

³⁹ Ibid, 224.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 223.

These emotional outbursts were never portrayed in a negative light, like the aforementioned murder of the Spanish gold prospector. Yet while his personality is described as prone to outbursts, the description of his administrative style was always cool and collected. Hemming stated that he was always calm and fair to Spaniards “despite an acute awareness of Spanish duplicity and cruelty” that was based on Titu Cusi's *relación*. He further leaned on the Inca's account by stating that Titu Cusi clearly viewed his father as tolerant and slow to anger and that these were qualities that the Inca tried to emulate.⁴¹ As much as Hemming provided a stepping stone in the historiography, finally breaking from tradition that viewed Titu Cusi as an incompetent “pretender” to the throne, he also continued to perpetuate some of the myth that surrounded the Inca. He stated that Titu Cusi's negotiations were an attempt to keep Vilcabamba's sovereignty, although he broke with previous arguments by stating that Titu Cusi was not attempting to submit as a vassal to the king but rather “create a state within a state, like Lesotho or Botswana.”⁴² His depiction of the negotiations showed them as merely the next step in Titu Cusi's skilled manipulations seeking to postpone the end of his sovereign territory, steps that progressed from raids to coexistence and the use of negotiations. However, his recognition of the ruler's adept handling of Spanish officials gave Titu Cusi more credit than others had previously given him (“a skillful blend of proud independence and obsequious submission”) and his portrayal of the Inca as a rebellious Indian attempting to maintain his people's culture and self-government gave Titu Cusi more credit than he

⁴¹ Hemming, 224. It is unclear what evidence Hemming is using to argue that Titu Cusi was attempting to emulate his father's virtues in his rule besides the *relación* itself. If he was, in fact, attempting to follow these personality traits then, by Hemming's own account, the quick-tempered and murderous ruler did not succeed.

⁴² Ibid, 224.

deserved (“Titu Cusi was not tempted by the comforts of Cusco as his brother Sayri-Túpac had been”).⁴³

Also in the 1970s, Karen Spalding offered a challenge to previous historical concepts about the Andes that could be considered well before her time. Spalding wrote “Social Climbers: Changing Patterns of Mobility among the Indians of Colonial Peru” and while she was not arguing over the case of Titu Cusi Yupanqui, she certainly made a case that is relevant to his study. She argued that historiography had studied social mobility for too long through the lens of mobility from the indigenous sphere to the Spanish sphere. By doing so, she argued, one was granting preeminence to Spanish society and implicitly agreeing that “rank and status” could only be obtained in Spanish Peru. Similarly, Spalding pointed out that Hispanicized Indians would seek social validation in different ways than indigenous peoples who maintained an Andean perspective. This would certainly apply – as the Inca was raised as a young boy in Spanish Peruvian society – to Titu Cusi’s case.⁴⁴ Perhaps the most germane comment her “Social Climbers” made to Titu Cusi’s historiography was when she noted that Eurocentric views believed Indians to be stratified under Spaniards while Andean views might see them as stratified separately, like a Venn Diagram that did not overlap: “From his [the Indian’s] point of view, he was not at the bottom of the social hierarchy in the Spanish world; he was outside it altogether.”⁴⁵

The historiography on Titu Cusi continued to change greatly in the 1980s and 1990s. The questions that were being asked about the Inca no longer revolved solely

⁴³ Hemming, 225.

⁴⁴ Karen Spalding, “Social Climbers: Changing Patterns of Mobility among the Indians of Colonial Peru,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 50 (1970): 645.

⁴⁵ Spalding, “Social Climbers,” 649.

around his legitimacy, temper, or weight but rather on the negotiations and *relación* itself. As the result of the linguistic turn, many historians began to write cultural and philological studies concerning the Inca's account. Some of the first of these studies came from Rolena Adorno, Frank Salomon, and Raquel Chang-Rodriguez. Chang-Rodriguez followed Adorno's lead when she pondered the relationship between written versus spoken language and argued that Titu Cusi's use of a *relación* was, in fact, a form of resistance itself.⁴⁶ Frank Salomon went one step further by creating a parallel relationship between Spaniards and Amerindians when he stated, "Incas and Spaniards do essentially the same things, striking blows and counter-blows, and they talk the same way, in hortatory set-pieces of archaizing style."⁴⁷ Susan Paulson also recognized the power of language and written accounts in Andean society when she argued that many indigenous nobles were caught in a difficult position of trying to maximize relations with the "dominant Spanish" while trying to contribute to the survival of their people and maintain and reproduce their own values, beliefs, and traditions.⁴⁸ In addition, John Charles wrote on the topic when he argued for the power of literacy and language when he stated that those that could read and interpret religious doctrine could use such abilities, much like Titu Cusi did in his *relación*, to protect themselves or increase their gains by invoking Christian knowledge as a defense.⁴⁹ However, in 1991, Patricia Seed

⁴⁶ Raquel Chang-Rodriguez, "Writing as Resistance: Peruvian History and the *Relacion* of Titu Cusi Yupanqui," in *From Oral to Written Expression: Native Andean Chronicles of Early Colonial Period*, ed. Rolena Adorno (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 41-64.

⁴⁷ Frank Salomon, "Chronicles of the Impossible: Notes on Three Peruvian Indigenous Historians," in *From Oral to Written Expression: Native Andean Chronicles of Early Colonial Period*, ed. Rolena Adorno (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 1

⁴⁸ Susan Paulson, "Double-Talk in the Andes: Ambiguous Discourse as Means of Surviving Contact," *Journal of Folklore Research* 27 (1990), 51.

⁴⁹ John Charles, *Allies at Odds: The Andean Church and its Indigenous Agents, 1583-1671* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010), 25.

applied the theory to Andean history in a definitive work on Atahualpa and those who chronicled his life, including Titu Cusi.

Patricia Seed wrote “Failing to Marvel: Atahualpa's Encounter With the Word” in 1991, still focusing on the impact of written and spoken language. Her work was very critical of ethnocentric historians and, in this light, she also viewed Titu Cusi as an historian like other works have done. The article was explicitly critical of John Hemming's work, labeling him as an “historical-realist historian” who grants undue favoritism for written, eyewitness sources over unwritten sources.⁵⁰ She was also critical of those who wrote prior to Frank Salomon as she saw his parallel relationships as an example of “narrative equalization.”⁵¹ To her, Salomon was the first to argue against the predominant paradigm that either consciously or subconsciously aggrandized Spanish society on the basis of their writing system. After Salomon, writing was more important as a political tool than it was as an example of supposed “cultural superiority” and “civilization.” Seed, as others had done before her, also attempted to argue that Titu Cusi consciously used Spanish language and writing to his advantage in order to achieve his gains when she stated, “[d]uring the final years of this war, the leader of the rebellion, Titu Cusi Yupanqui, attempted to achieve through language (the other major weapon of European domination) what he was unable to achieve through war: recognition by the Spanish Crown as the legitimate native lord of Peru[...].”⁵² This argument fit well with John Hemming's progressivist view of Spanish-Inca relations of violence, negotiations, then coexistence. It also implied an adroit handling of Spanish officials by Titu Cusi for

⁵⁰ Patricia Seed, “Failing to Marvel: Atahualpa's Encounter With the Word,” *Latin American Research Review* 26 (1991), 7-10.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁵² *Ibid.*

knowingly using writing and language to his advantage. However, in her treatment of the Inca's manipulations Seed failed to examine other purposes for demonizing the Spaniards. If true, that Titu Cusi desired above all else to be recognized by the Spanish Crown as the legitimate native lord of Peru, *why* did he desire it? “Failing to Marvel” did not delve this deeply into the Inca's motivations.

While the trends in historiography have changed greatly in how literally to take the colonial accounts of Spaniards (and indigenous chroniclers), Seed argued for a perception that reality could only be created by Titu Cusi as he was closer culturally to indigenous history than were the Spaniards. To her, this was a powerful weapon that he used against officials. She stated that, “Implicitly invoking his position as an Inca who was not close to the event temporally but close to it in culture and kinship, Titu Cusi called attention to his knowledge of Inca cultural rhetoric and performance in a persuasive manner. This strategy enabled him to claim a distinct authority from the one Europeans claimed for themselves – the status of eyewitnesses to the event[...]⁵³

Although the question of purpose again arises. If Titu Cusi's claims for legitimate descent and closer cultural connection were an attempt to legitimize his historical narrative, as she argues, then what function did a legitimate historical narrative create?⁵⁴

The implication seemed to be that Titu Cusi's goal was the continued cultural existence of the Inca by arguing for a cultural equivalence of *chicha* and writing and by revealing the “cultural limitations of the dominant.”⁵⁵ Such an argument was not too far removed from

⁵³ Seed, 21.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 29. Seed argued that Titu Cusi's careful use of language (e.g. when he addresses historical players by their familial roles to him like “my uncle Atahualpa”) was an important part of his appropriation of the Spanish system of writing.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 31.

John Hemming's thesis that Titu Cusi was devoted to the “traditions” and “cultural preservation of the state.”⁵⁶

Kathryn Burns has also recently contributed to the historiography of writing as power. She cited examples of Peruvian history such as the Papelitos/Vasquez lawsuit to show how those who could put their arguments down on paper were significantly more likely to achieve their goals.⁵⁷ She also acknowledged the role that writing had in establishing *costumbre*. In the Inca Titu Cusi's case, many of his actions were permitted by the Crown because of *costumbre*, or “local custom.” Burns argued that the power of writing enabled such people to establish certain *costumbres* that may not have previously existed, thus rewriting the laws retroactively for their own benefits.⁵⁸ This concept of *costumbre* as an effective implementation of indigenous agency was also further explored in Yanna Yannakakis's “*Costumbre: A Language of Negotiation in Eighteenth Century Oaxaca.*”⁵⁹

While Yannakakis' study was on Oaxaca in Mexico, her study of *costumbre* are highly relevant to the study of indigenous royalty's negotiations into power and the legal justifications of their past actions. Yannakakis argued strongly for the existence and probability of negotiation but also argued that it was also a necessity to have some form of violence in order for negotiation to flourish.⁶⁰ This contended that Titu Cusi's negotiation was not simply a product of his own ability and manipulations but also was

⁵⁶ Hemming, 224.

⁵⁷ Kathryn Burns, *Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010): 82.

⁵⁸ Burns, *Into the Archive*, 139.

⁵⁹ Yanna Yannakakis, “*Costumbre: A Language of Negotiation in Eighteenth-Century Oaxaca,*” in *Negotiation Within Domination: New Spain's Indian Pueblos Confront the Spanish State*, eds. Ethelia Ruiz Medrano and Susan Kellogg (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 2010).

⁶⁰ I am using “negotiation” here as it is meant in the book's title: a political and social discourse that allows the potential for social mobility and administrative reforms.

the result of his father's rebellion, true in both the diplomatic sense of “negotiation” and in the social mobility sense of the word.

Prior to Burns' contribution to the historiography of writing as an instrument of negotiation, she wrote a history that did not shift the paradigm of Titu Cusi's history (as he was not her focus) but brought the history back to a social/political methodology as opposed to its current focus on philological perspectives. In her work “Gender and the Politics of Mestizaje: The Convent of Santa Clara in Cuzco, Peru,” Burns returned to the paradigms that argued over legitimacy and threats to legitimacy and that sought to portray indigenous leaders as either rebels or apostates. In regards to the latter paradigm, Burns followed Hemming's lead in portraying the Andean ruler as one whose sole goal was the preservation of autonomy for his people.⁶¹ Yet this shift in historiography back to the social/political ramifications of Titu Cusi Yupanqui's motivations for negotiating went far beyond Burns. Ralph Bauer, an English professor who wrote the English translation of Titu Cusi's *An Inca Account of the Conquest of Peru* briefly argued for the previous two decades' theories of the importance of language in his account (although his focus was on a Quechua-to-Spanish perspective, not a spoken-to-written one) before delving into some previously unaddressed issues. Bauer broke from Hemming's persistent image of Titu Cusi as a selfless ruler worthy of admiration but continued the ubiquitous argument that the Amerindian leader simply wanted to delay negotiations to preserve Vilcabamba's autonomy.⁶² These arguments continued to stem from Lope Garcia de Castro's complaints that the Inca wanted to delay the resolution of a treaty,

⁶¹ Kathryn Burns, “Gender and the Politics of Mestizaje: The Convent of Santa Clara in Cuzco, Peru,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 78 (1998), 9-11.

⁶² Ralph Bauer, Introduction to *An Inca Account of the Conquest of Peru* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2005).

something Spanish officials were eagerly waiting for.⁶³ Bauer also reversed Hemming's argument, reapplying the perception of Titu Cusi's conversion to Christianity as insincere, this time citing Titu Cusi's tolerance for continued indigenous practices. He neither used this example to argue for Titu Cusi's compassion and tolerance as Hemming had done nor to argue for Titu Cusi's strong desire to preserve his cultural heritage as Seed had done. To Bauer, Titu Cusi was merely seeking ways to postpone negotiations in order to preserve his Neo-Inca state against an imminent threat from the Spaniards.⁶⁴

Another current piece of scholarship that deals extensively with the Vilcabamba Inca is the late anthropologist and ethnohistorian Catherine Julien's research entitled "Francisco de Toledo and His Campaign against the Incas." In this work, she approached the idea of negotiations with the rebellious Incas from a different angle; instead of discussing the difficulties and controversies over negotiation from the side of the Inca, Julien dealt with the talks from Spanish perspectives. To begin, Julien mentioned that Viceroy Francisco de Toledo was intent on denying "the legitimacy of the Inca dynastic line that had been recognized in Spain for four decades." This was important to Toledo because then he would be free to assign whomever he wished to the posts of *kuraka* and could also then refuse to implement the *Capitulación de Acobamba* and keep the *encomiendas* that had been promised to Titu Cusi.⁶⁵ The article went on to question Manco Inca's legitimacy by stating that the negotiations were undertaken because of Spanish officials who believed in a "rumor" that stated that Manco Inca was the true heir. This discussion of Manco Inca's lineage, however, also followed Yanna Yannakakis'

⁶³ Nowack, 71. This quote stated that "all his [Titu Cusi's] overtures to me are tricks and delays."

⁶⁴ Bauer.

⁶⁵ Catherine Julien, "Francisco de Toledo and His Campaign against the Incas," *Colonial Latin American Review* 16 (2007), 243.

theory that violence was necessary for negotiation to occur as the narrative portrays the negotiations between colonial officials (most likely Paullu Túpac) and Manco Inca as the direct result of his attacks on Cusco, Jauja, and Lima in 1536.⁶⁶ However, after a brief discussion of the negotiations with Sayri Túpac and his departure for Cusco, Julien then examined the relationship between Spaniards in Cusco and Spaniards in Lima. While many historians question the sincerity of Titu Cusi's end of the negotiations, Julian questioned the sincerity of those in Cusco, stating that “the royal government centered in Lima appears to have had more sincere intentions to negotiate with the Vilcabamba Incas than either the Spaniards or the Incas in Cusco, who had no reason to favor the granting of *encomiendas* to their relatives in Vilcabamba.”⁶⁷ She also broke from the more current paradigm of the son of Titu Cusi, Quispe Titu's marriage to his cousin as being arranged and coerced by Spaniards rather than being tolerated:

After a rough period in relations between Cuzco and the Vilcabamba Incas in the early 1560s, characterized by violence and misunderstanding, the Capitulations of Acobamba were negotiated by viceregal authorities in 1565. Titu Cusi would receive a pardon for himself and his captains; income that would support him outside of Vilcabamba (including both *encomiendas* and grants of property); and permission for his son, Felipe Quispe Titu, to marry Sayre Tupa's daughter, who had inherited the *encomienda* of Yucay. Titu Cusi, in turn, was to renounce sovereignty, accept baptism, and allow missionaries and civil authorities into the province of Vilcabamba.⁶⁸

Julien argued that Titu Cusi did all of these things, further breaking from the long-lasting concept that Titu Cusi was only concerned with the sovereignty of his territory. Julien contended that it was not Titu Cusi who was delaying the fulfillment of the *Capitulación de Acobamba* but Toledo, who arrived in 1569 (the same year that Philip II confirmed the

⁶⁶ Julien, 243.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 244.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

treaty in Madrid) and immediately set to work on discrediting the Inca in order to avoid implementing the treaty. Julien claimed that Toledo chose war over the treaty and argued that his commissioning of Sarmiento to write a disparaging history against the Inca line was the first step in this war.⁶⁹ She also argued against an imminent threat being posed to Vilcabamba. While she acknowledged several threats of war had been made against Vilcabamba, she also noted that all of these threats had been resolved and that the Inca had stockpiled a rather sizable quantity of arms at Vilcabamba, including “a fair quantity of Spanish artillery.”⁷⁰ Perhaps the biggest break from the historiography, however, was when Julien argued that it was not the temper of Túpac Amaru I in killing a Spanish official that ended his reign so quickly with a colonial military campaign but Toledo's war against Titu Cusi. She made the rare statement that the campaign was undertaken originally to capture Titu Cusi as Toledo did not know that he had already died. When they arrived, however, she said the captain just captured Túpac Amaru instead.⁷¹

As Julien believed that Titu Cusi was the object of his military campaign that ultimately killed the last Inca, Túpac Amaru, the two most important historical actors in Francisco de Toledo and his campaign against the Incas were Toledo himself and Titu Cusi. She acknowledged that, historiographically, Titu Cusi's actions were seen as “dilatory or even duplicitous” but stated that an adequate answer for the Inca remaining in Vilcabamba has not been put forth as of yet and that an equally important question is “whether or not the Spaniards lived up to their end of the bargain.”⁷² Julien argued that the source of the scapegoating of Titu Cusi Yupanqui for not fulfilling the terms of the

⁶⁹ Julien, 244.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 249.

⁷¹ Ibid, 245.

⁷² Ibid.

Capitulation of Acobamba lies in the work of the Argentinian historian Roberto Levillier. Levillier's portrayal of Toledo was of a very unbiased and tolerant man who desired that the peace between Spanish Peru and Vilcabamba remain unbroken. She stated that “[n]o one had seen more of the documentation generated by Toledo than Levillier, so that portrait he painted has remained definitive.”⁷³ In order to challenge his paradigm, Julien suggested a “reframing” of the context that involved Philip II, Cardinal Diego de Espinosa, and Bartolomé de las Casas.

Las Casas was considered an important player to Julien in the “war” between Toledo and Titu Cusi even though he had never been to Peru because of the treatise he wrote to Philip II shortly before the end of his life. In *Tratado de las doce dudas*, the Dominican friar attacked the *encomienda* system, stated that Titu Cusi should be restored as Inca in Peru, and any unrectified abuses committed against the indigenous peoples of the Americas would result in Philip's eternal damnation.⁷⁴ Governor Lope Garcia de Castro, meanwhile, played his own role by being encouraged by the king of Spain to find some kind of deal with Titu Cusi “if you are convinced that [Tito] is the grandson of Huayna Capac.”⁷⁵ After discussing the marriage between Titu Cusi's son and his niece, argued as a financial necessity, Julien then discussed the negotiations between the two sides in a new light that, instead of portraying Titu Cusi as dilatory, saw the frequently reopened and changed negotiations as adjustments made on the part of Garcia de Castro.⁷⁶ Julien continued that theme when she argued that the incident that nearly derailed the treaty-saving provision of the *encomienda* wedding between Titu Cusi's son,

⁷³ Julien, 246.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 247.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 249.

Quispe Titu, and his niece, Beatriz – her forced marriage and repeated rape to ensure the validity of the marriage by Cristobal de Maldonado – was in fact a political maneuver. It has been previously argued that the marriage was “stolen” by Maldonado for economic purposes: in order to gain the income from the *encomiendas* that Beatriz held. While this certainly was an added benefit, Julien further argued that the marriage was specifically undertaken in order to prevent Titu Cusi from receiving said income and, therefore, ensuring the completion of the treaty.⁷⁷

One of the most recent works on the penultimate Inca was done by Kerstin Nowack in 2006. Her article, “*Las mercedes que pedía para su salida: The Vilcabamba Inca and the Spanish State, 1539-1572,*” had a fatalist view of negotiations between the Spaniards and Vilcabamba Inca, arguing that by the time of Titu Cusi's reign, peace would have already been “impossible.”⁷⁸ Nowack's work was very unique as she provided context for the argument either for or against Titu Cusi's legitimacy, neither taking the Inca's genealogical account as accurate nor trusting Sarmiento's agenda to discredit the ruler to bastardy, arguing that he was “possibly illegitimate.”⁷⁹ Unlike early works that were bent on portraying the Inca as a pretender to the throne or propagandizing him as the one and true “son of the sun,” Nowack did not focus on the Inca's dubious lineage but rather the importance of that dubious lineage on negotiations. She argued that due to his equivocal ancestry, Spanish officials were hesitant to open negotiations with him, fearing another situation like that which was encountered with Sayri Túpac where a capitulation was negotiated but Sayri Túpac failed to secure the end

⁷⁷ Julien, 251.

⁷⁸ Nowack, 62.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 68.

to the Vilcabamba rebellion.⁸⁰ To Nowack, Titu Cusi had many other motivations as opposed to the single-minded and altruistic desires that other historians had attributed to him. For example, the first step in Hemming's progressivist chronology, violence through raids, were not conducted because he was emulating his father's rebellious spirit at Kubler had argued nor as a political maneuver against Spanish Peru as Hemming argued, but rather as an attempt to legitimize his rule and out of economic necessity.⁸¹ She also argued against Bauer's theory that there was a persistent threat to the existence of Vilcabamba, stating that negotiations with Titu Cusi were initiated by the Spaniards in response to a growing fear that the Inca was able to secure treaties with more Amerindian groups that would rise up in a "great conspiracy against them." While dismissing these fears as unfounded, Nowack also acknowledged their key role in legitimizing Titu Cusi, stating that "[i]n light of such fears, Titu Cusi was from 1565 treated with more sensitivity, and was able to open a new round of negotiations."⁸² She further argued against an imminent threat by noting that when officials asked for permission to undertake military operations, Governor García de Castro responded that they were not permitted.⁸³

Nowack also introduced the economic aspect of Titu Cusi's rebellion as this Marxist methodology had been noticeably absent from Titu Cusi historiography. Nowack's Titu Cusi was a man that was occasionally driven by economic necessity, not just in obvious instances such as his raids on *encomiendas*. Her argument also stated that the marriage of Quispe Tito, Titu Cusi's son, to his cousin Beatriz has been repeatedly

⁸⁰ Nowack, 70-73.

⁸¹ Kubler, 197, Hemming, 225, and Nowack, 70.

⁸² Nowack, 70.

⁸³ Ibid, 71.

mistaken as a delay tactic or a gesture of good faith in the past. However, she stated, it was actually an economic move in order to gain her *encomiendas* that she controlled after they had been granted to her father, Sayri Túpac. By marrying his son at eight years old, Titu Cusi would be able to control all of the *encomiendas* that she controlled as her regent.⁸⁴ This was a powerful argument for Nowack as it challenged the previously held notion that Spaniards were the ones being tolerant of a marriage between an Inca and his cousin. According to Nowack, it was upon suggestion of the Spanish officials that this was done and it was Titu Cusi who had to accept this rather unorthodox marriage partner due to the fact that it was *costumbre* that the Inca marry his sister to make her *coya*. She noted that Titu Cusi had already designated his daughter, Quispe Sisa Tunta to become his son's wife.⁸⁵

Nowack was also one of the only historians to acknowledge or examine the *Capitulación de Acobamba* that Titu Cusi signed in 1566 as it did not bolster arguments for Titu Cusi as an irrepressible rebel spirit. She stated that,

[N]egotiations with Titu Cusi proceeded, and finally the Capitulation de Acobamba was signed in August 1566. The first steps in compliance were taken in 1567 with the baptism of Felipe Quispe Tito, son of Titu Cusi. Diego Rodriguez de Figueroa was sworn in as corregidor of Vilcabamba and Spanish priests started proselytizing there. Officially, Vilcabamba had become a province in the Spanish viceroyalty. In August 1568, Titu Cusi also accepted baptism, and received the guardianship of Beatriz[...] Yet a further obstacle was that the Capitulation de Acobamba contained no provision for the other Inca refugees[...]⁸⁶

However, her work argued against Titu Cusi's sincerity in his conversion to Christianity as she also perpetuated the view that the timing of his second wife was incongruous with his supposed newfound piety. This argument though was supported mainly by

⁸⁴ Nowack, 71.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 73.

speculation as she noted that “when captured in 1572, the two eldest [of Titu Cusi's children], Felipe Quispe Tito and Quispe Sisa Tunta, were fifteen and seventeen years old respectively; his other children were much younger, barely six years of age. This suggests that Titu Cusi began to wed secondary wives around 1565, at the very time of his conversion to Christianity.”⁸⁷ This argument led her to conclude that previous historiography of Titu Cusi's ultimate aims were accurate, stating that “[p]erhaps he hoped to live in semi-independence, officially a vassal of the Crown, but in fact living outside their direct sphere of power.”⁸⁸ While some of her points certainly are a perpetuation of previously argued dogma, such as Titu Cusi's ultimate aim and desire to postpone fulfilling the treaty, some of them certainly deviated from the trite.⁸⁹ Nowack also challenged Hemming's argument that “Titu Cusi had not been tempted by the comforts of Cuzco” by arguing that he was, in fact, not even *permitted* to leave by other leaders. She quoted Titu Cusi when she stated that “as the captains saw that they were about to lose the Indians they had taken...they refused to allow [Titu Cusi] to leave.”⁹⁰

The historiography on the subject of Titu Cusi and his negotiations is not merely limited to what historians have said explicitly about him. Many aspects of his life have been presented over and over again with different results. For example, while some historians that wrote only on the Vilcabamba Inca have been less than courteous about the ruler's motivations in writing such an appeal to the king, Donald Chipman wrote a book that dealt with elite indigenous descendants legitimizing their appeals to the Crown. Chipman argued that the Spanish Crown attempted to keep indigenous hierarchies intact

⁸⁷ Nowack, 75.

⁸⁸ Ibid. Not only does this argument not challenge previously believed historiography, but it is worth noting that on this point Nowack cited John Hemming and George Kubler as her sources.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 76.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 74.

to facilitate control of the majority population in their new empire.⁹¹ Furthermore, Chipman's discussion of Moctezuma II's children directly applied to the study of Titu Cusi's *relación* and his own royal appeals when he argued, "In the document of conveyance, Cortés takes pains to establish Moctezuma II's unwavering friendship for Spaniards. This historical 'revisionism' was necessary in order to win approval from the king for such a generous grant to the emperor's daughter."⁹² This is unique to the historiography of the Andes as it portrayed an additional necessity for establishing legitimacy beyond an egotistical ruler and attempts to consolidate his power. He also went on to show that two of Moctezuma II's children, Isabel and Pedro, both argued for a close relationship with Cortés, much like Titu Cusi argued for his father in regards to Francisco Pizarro.⁹³ Not only was this seen as a necessity for indigenous royal descendants (as opposed to acts of greed and desperation that Titu Cusi was typically cast with) but it was also considered socially acceptable as Chipman noted that "Charles V's concession represents clear recognition of noble status for native elites and their descendants in their own lands."⁹⁴

Titu Cusi's historiography has changed greatly from the first chronicles written by Spaniards intent on discrediting him. The earliest accounts were disparaging accounts that focused on his alleged bastardy and his physical appearance and gave the Inca little to no credit in managing Vilcabamba and Vitcos. Early twentieth century narratives attempted to professionalize Titu Cusi's historiography but failed in shifting the paradigm. To Philip Ainsworth Means and George Kubler, he was still a usurper and an

⁹¹ Donald Chipman, *Moctezuma's Children: Aztec Royalty Under Spanish Rule, 1520-1700* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 37.

⁹² *Ibid*, 49.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 57, 90.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 85.

incompetent ruler who made his gains through the weaknesses of others. In the midst of the civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s, Hemming shifted the paradigm to argue for a kind and compassionate ruler who only thought of the needs of his followers rather than the needs of himself. While this argument was in line with popular “noble savage” stereotypes, Hemming also advanced the field by empowering Titu Cusi and examining where his capabilities lied rather than what his deficiencies were. The 1980s and 1990s saw enormous change in the field as many writers focused on philological aspects of the account and negotiations rather than on the looks and personality of the Inca himself. And finally, the new millennium has brought forth various historians, anthropologists, and even an English professor who sought to balance the conflicting paradigms with a more thorough and analytical view of the Inca and his reign. Some have even questioned the process of succession and legitimacy that many earlier historians used to label Titu Cusi illegitimate. R. Alan Covey, for example, wrote his work “Chronology, Succession, and Sovereignty: The Politics of Inka Historiography and Its Modern Interpretation” in 2006 and had a subsection entitled “Rethinking Inka Succession” in which he argued that the patterns for Inca succession were murky at best. His thesis on the subject seemed to bolster Titu Cusi's credibility when he stated that “The leader of the Chupaychu of the Huánuco region testified that adult sons tended to succeed their fathers (pending Inka approval), but that collateral succession of close relatives occurred if there were no male children, or if those children were too young to take office.”⁹⁵ He went on to state that the concept of primogeniture (as Sarmiento was

⁹⁵ R. Alan Covey, “Chronology, Succession, and Sovereignty: The Politics of Inka Historiography and Its Modern Interpretation,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 48 (2006), 187.

using to argue for Titu Cusi's traitorous rise to the throne) was implemented as the result of “feedback during the colonial period.”⁹⁶

Historians, not history, have largely ignored and omitted this man from relevance. William Prescott wrote an enormous monograph of the conquest of Peru and did not mention Manco Inca's son a single time. In 1957, John Howland Rowe wrote a political history of colonial institutions imposed on indigenous residents of Peru that was introduced through the context of indigenous rebellion and even then the penultimate Inca did not garner any attention. Instead, he was relegated to a description as the successor of Manco 'Inka (Manco Inca) who continued his father's campaigns against *encomiendas* before plotting a revolution in 1565.⁹⁷ In this work, not only was Titu Cusi historically marginalized through omission but also by mention as his impact on indigenous peoples, the Spanish government, and the history of Peru had been termed only a “harassment of Spaniards.” Amateur historian and anthropologist Kim MacQuarrie similarly failed to give Titu Cusi an appropriate amount of attention, instead focusing on his father’s rebellion that MacQuarrie portrayed in an unabashedly pro-Indian light. To MacQuarrie, Manco Inca was fighting valiantly towards his own inevitable death in order to permanently eject Spaniards from the Empire of his people.

In the future, more work can definitely be done on the topic from a New Philological perspective. While I am, regrettably, currently unable to analyze documents about the negotiations in Latin-text Quechua, there lies the potential for future students to fill this niche in Titu Cusi’s historiography. As Adorno and other New Philological scholars have noted, language, translation, and dictation are very important in a work like

⁹⁶ Covey, 188.

⁹⁷ John Howland Rowe, “The Incas Under Spanish Colonial Institutions,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 37 (1957), 155.

the Inca's *relación*. Matthew Restall has suggested that this would demarginalize commoners in indigenous history.⁹⁸ However, as we have seen, even indigenous rulers have been pushed to the margins of history books. Although the field is far from complete, as more work needs to be done on Titu Cusi's motivations for negotiation, his ability to manipulate, and the role of his advisors, progress has certainly been made over the last four and a half centuries and the picture of the Inca is slowly becoming more complete. We understand him to be skilled as a ruler and emotional as a person. We see him as resentful towards Spaniards and possibly ambivalent towards religion. We also can recognize that he took great measures to protect Inca culture although the reasons behind such efforts are still debatable. No matter the current holes in his historiography, Titu Cusi has rightfully been reimagined as an important and dynamic ruler that helped shape the events of sixteenth century Peru and beyond.

⁹⁸ Matthew Restall, "A History of the New Philology and the New Philology in History," *Latin American Research Review* 38 (2003): 113-134.

Chapter III

THE BUILD UP: THE BACKGROUND HISTORY OF SPAIN AND TAHUANTINSUYU

“Know you who may come to this land that there is more gold in it than there is iron in Vizcaya.”

-Note from the conquistador Bocanegra⁹⁹

“Had the land not been divided by the wars between Huáscar and Atahualpa, we would not have been able to enter or win the land unless we could gather one thousand Spaniards for the task...”

-Pedro Pizarro¹⁰⁰

Much of the history that provides context for Titu Cusi’s negotiations is murky at best. While the history of the conquistadors is well-documented and thoroughly debated, Tahuantinsuyu’s history lacks consensus among historians not only in its interpretation but also in the question of what is true history and what is national myth.¹⁰¹ In addition, there is always the scholarly question of how far back and how inclusive is enough for sufficient context? Certainly an understanding of the conquest is necessary to understand the Spanish-Inca conflict but is an understanding of the *Reconquista* necessary for an understanding of the conquest? Would that mean an understanding of the original invasions by the Moors was necessary in order to fully appreciate the *Reconquista*?

⁹⁹ Bocanegra, as found in Pedro Pizarro, *Relation of the Discovery and Conquest of the Kingdoms of Peru*, (New York: The Cortes Society, 1921), 154.

¹⁰⁰ Pizarro, 199.

¹⁰¹ Karen Spalding, *Huaro-chiri: an Andean society under Inca and Spanish Rule* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 74.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to begin somewhere and most historians begin the discussion of the conquest in fifteenth century Iberia. As previously mentioned, on the eve of Columbus' voyage to the Americas, the kingdoms that would eventually become Spain were locked in battle with the remaining Muslim kingdom of Grenada. The Muslim invasion of Iberia occurred in 711 and the "reconquest" of the peninsula was less of an active campaign than many students might believe. There was occasional struggle for the nearly eight hundred years of Muslim occupation but much of the warfare only occurred between the ninth and thirteenth centuries. Castile's capture (or recapture) of Seville left Grenada as the last remaining stronghold of Islam on the Iberian Peninsula. Portugal had already been recognized as independent by the papacy in 1179, eventually ushering in an era of naval exploration that the kingdoms of Spain would follow.¹⁰² While the *Reconquista* may seem like just as arbitrary of a starting point for colonial Spanish American history as any, it is important as the Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula would also have unexpected consequences. Historians have argued that it was the veterans of these battles who brought to the Indies the pillaging and destructive mindset that would be used or taught in the Americas against the pagan natives. It has also been suggested that the *Reconquista* solidified and justified the war efforts in the Americas under the belief that God was on their side and was pleased to see Christians enjoy the spoils of war.¹⁰³

After the fall of Grenada and the completion of the Reconquest in 1492, Spain was on a "post-conquest high" that led to the partnership between Ferdinand II, Isabella I, and Christopher Columbus. It has been well-chronicled that the hope of Columbus was to

¹⁰² Burkholder and Johnson, 24-5.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

find a route to Cathay (China) for trade and that he greatly underestimated the westward distance from Europe to mainland Asia. In his goals for family nobility, Columbus departed from Spain on August 3, 1492 to the Canary Islands in order to circumvent the westerlies that had prevented earlier expeditions from succeeding from the Azores. On October 10, in the midst of an atmosphere of discontent among the crew, land was sighted that was most likely San Salvador Island in the Bahamas. After pressing on in order to find Cipangu (Japan), Columbus then made landfall in what is now known as Cuba and then the island of Ayti as it was known by its Taino residents. Columbus claimed the island for Spain and renamed it Española. This fateful expedition would inspire further voyages west and initiate the age of conquest and colonization in the Americas.¹⁰⁴

The follow-up expeditions and conquests in the Caribbean brought many names that are familiar to the study of history and helped the conquistadors gain experience for battles on the mainland. Men like Diego de Almagro and Francisco Pizarro gained their experience in Española and the conquest of the Aztecs in Mexico.¹⁰⁵ Explorations of new territories frequently brought rumors of rich kingdoms in faraway lands which spurred the imaginations of conquistadors eager to equal or exceed the success and riches of Tenochtitlan in Mexico.¹⁰⁶ One of these stories caught the attention of Francisco

¹⁰⁴ “Christopher Columbus,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*.

¹⁰⁵ This pattern would continue as conquest beget conquest. Pizarro’s conquest of Tahuantinsuyu gained valuable experience for men like Hernando de Soto who would use that experience in his exploration of what is now the United States’ southeast. Also, the importance of this experience gained by conquistadors cannot be understated. Those who traveled to the “new world” were not professional soldiers but usually men whose social and economic mobility was hindered on the peninsula and sought success elsewhere. However, we will examine these men in further detail later.

¹⁰⁶ Stories of the richness of Peru turned out to be true but it was not uncommon for indigenous peoples to use this to their tactical advantage. During Coronado’s exploration of the American West, they were given a scout who was to lead them to their deaths on the way to a mythical kingdom of riches. Similarly, scouts were also to lead Diego de Almagro and his troops to their deaths in the Atacama desert in Chile.

Pizarro and his two partners, Diego de Almagro and the priest Hernando de Luque on an expedition to Panama in 1522.¹⁰⁷ It was stated that,

They could not conquer that province of Peru as it is in a very mountainous country and has very bellicose people who put poisonous herbs on their arrows. They are people who keep watch by night and sound the quarter horns upon drums. And the province is small and on bad soil.¹⁰⁸

Yet despite the dangers that were said to lie before them and the improbability of success, the infamous Spanish desire for gold won out. Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala wrote that there was much excitement about the possibility of wealth in South America even a decade before Pizarro's initial expeditions, stating that Spaniards were shouting day and night, "The Indies! The Indies! Gold, silver! Gold, silver from Peru!"¹⁰⁹

Despite the simplicity with which textbooks frequently treat the conquest, it was a long and often deadly process. With Father Luque's financial support, Pizarro's first exploration to the south in 1524 led to nothing. Famine and aggressively belligerent Indians would force the explorers back to Panama.¹¹⁰ The second voyage had a similarly inauspicious start. Hundreds of men died of hunger and disease and it was decided that Almagro should be sent back to Panama while Pizarro and his men should remain on the islands of Gallo and Borgona in order to prevent an ordered termination of the expedition.¹¹¹ The Spaniards that remained on the islands were deathly ill and were said

¹⁰⁷ Burkholder and Johnson, 61.

¹⁰⁸ Pizarro, 134-5.

¹⁰⁹ Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, *The First New Chronicle and Good Government*, trans. David Frye (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006), 104. It is worth noting that while *Good Government's* illustrations are ubiquitous in Andean histories, historians have used Guaman Poma's work to various degrees in Andean history. My work has regarded Guaman Poma's accounts as unverified at best and I have only used it as a corroborating work. For example, his work claimed that the Indies were named as such not in a reference to India and the East Indies but because it was so high in altitude, "*In Dies*" meaning "Land In Day." He also seemed to confuse terms such as *ayllu* by not only inaccurately translating the word, but interpreting the meaning to suggest that Rome was an *ayllu* of Castile.

¹¹⁰ Burkholder and Johnson, 61.

¹¹¹ Pizarro, 136.

to have been yellow from famine and disease. The conquistadors had the provisions to move onwards without reinforcements, but not without killing the horses.¹¹² This indicates the confidence (or foolhardiness) of the conquistadors that their mission would still be a success and that horses would be necessary later on.

The governor of Panama granted Almagro's request for reinforcements, allegedly only due to the lives of Pizarro and his dozen or so companions at Gallo that would have otherwise perished.¹¹³ These reinforcements would help the conquistadors push to the mainland, where they discovered an Inca settlement at Tumbez, a coastal civilization near the modern day border of Ecuador and Peru. After returning to Panama to seek further aid, Don Hernando de Luque attempted to negotiate with Pedro de los Ríos in order to obtain reinforcements. However, after their explanation of the hardships that they encountered in order to prove themselves admirable servants of the Crown, Pedro de los Ríos rejected their proposal on the basis that "one should not depopulate his province to go and conquer new lands."¹¹⁴ In response to this unforeseen obstacle, the partners of Luque, Almagro, and Pizarro raised enough money to send Pizarro back to Spain in order to seek a royal license from the Crown for the expedition into Tahuantinsuyu.¹¹⁵ This meeting with the king is noted by many contemporaries as sowing the initial seeds of discontent between Pizarro and Almagro that would later help shape the political landscape of Peru and Vilcabamba, although Pedro Pizarro unsurprisingly absolved his brother of any blame in the matter by accusing the Council of the Indies and its president,

¹¹² Pedro Cieza de León, *The Discovery and Conquest of Peru: Chronicles of the New World Encounter*, trans. Alexandra Parma Cook and Noble David Cook (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 51.

¹¹³ Pizarro, 137.

¹¹⁴ Cieza de León, 129-130.

¹¹⁵ Burkholder and Johnson, 61.

Conde de Osorno, by stating that they were the architects of the political scheme that disenfranchised Almagro:

In the Council they told him that it was not fitting that governorship be given to two companions [as was agreed upon between Almagro and Pizarro], because in Santa Marta it had been done, and one governor had killed the other. Would that it had pleased God our Lord that they had held to this decision always, for later on governorship was given to Don Diego de Almagro, and one of them killed the other, and all the battles and wars which have taken place in this kingdom have grown out of the event[...] Perceiving that there was no likelihood of his receiving what he asked for and desired, he did ask that the grant be made to him.¹¹⁶

With the contract naming Pizarro governor of an as yet undiscovered Peru and Almagro governor of Tumbez, an expedition of less than two hundred men set sail in December of 1530 under the command of Francisco Pizarro. After reaching Tumbez, the Spanish forces were augmented by the arrival of reinforcements under Hernando de Soto and the conquistadors proceeded into the heart of Tahuantinsuyu. Noticing evidence of a civil war that was engulfing the kingdom, Pizarro made the most of his campaign by gathering intelligence on the state of the war and communicated with both leaders of the war, Atahualpa and Huáscar, on the eve of the meeting at Cajamarca.¹¹⁷

Inca history, as previously mentioned, is very difficult to ascertain not because of a dearth of source material but rather because it is difficult to make out where myth ends and fact begins. Sources like Guaman Poma de Ayala begin their histories before the Inca civilization. *Good Government* stated that there were four “ages” of Indians in the Andes before the rise of the Incas as its “fifth age.”¹¹⁸ While many of these accounts connect the Inca civilization to the creator, Viracocha (or Contiti Viracocha), the “first king of the Incas” is generally agreed to be Manco Capac Inca. This king was credited

¹¹⁶ Pizarro, 141-2.

¹¹⁷ Burkholder and Johnson, 62-3.

¹¹⁸ Guaman Poma, 23-31.

with establishing Andean religion, designating which gods needed to be worshipped (as only the son of the Sun could do), building the first temples, creating a priestly class and teaching them ritual and ceremonies, and distributing all of the land.¹¹⁹ While this claim is already very likely to be hyperbole, origin myths become even more obvious with the arrival of Manco Capac's grandson, Lloque Yupanqui. Born to Manco's son Sinchi Roca [Cinche Roca], this son was sad to have been born with all of his teeth, to have begun walking immediately after his own birth, and to have refused breastfeeding. He was said to have thrown a rock at a rival boy as a newborn, breaking the boy's legs. His accomplishments were alleged to have begun as a toddler when he walked around and spoke with such wisdom that he was supposed to be a sorcerer.¹²⁰ Lloque Yupanqui's son was Capac Yupanqui, followed by Mayta Capac, Inca Capac Yupanqui, and Inca Roca Inca, respectively. Inca Roca Inca's son, Yaguar Guaca Inca Yupanqui was said to be the eldest of Inca Roca's thirty children and was born crying blood (Yaguar Guaca means "to cry blood").¹²¹ All of these rulers were said to have "achieved nothing greater than what his ancestors left him," yet Inca expansion began during the time of the eldest of Yaguar Guaca's fifty children, Viracocha Inca, whose name meant "king and god."¹²²

Viracocha Inca, the eighth recorded Inca in most histories (Betanzos left out Inca Capac Yupanqui), marks the beginning of clear historical figures in Inca history. At the beginning of his reign, rulers of the approximately two hundred territories surrounding

¹¹⁹ Bernabe Cobo, *History of the Inca Empire: An Account of the Indians' customs and their origin together with a treatise on Inca legends, history, and social institutions*, trans. Roland Hamilton (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 108.

¹²⁰ Juan de Betanzos, *Narrative of the Incas*, trans. Roland Hamilton and Dana Buchanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 17.

¹²¹ In Bernabe Cobo's account, Yaguar Guaca was given the name after being captured and imprisoned by his enemies. Cobo stated on page 126 of his history that Yaguar Guaca "wept blood out of sheer grief and suffering to see himself in such a miserable state."

¹²² Betanzos, 18.

Cusco named themselves Capac Inca (king) of their individual territory, much like Viracocha Inca did in Cusco. Viracocha Inca has been credited with the restoration of Cusco military and the building of Cusco infrastructure and monumental architecture.¹²³ However, at the same time, a rival Capac Inca, Uscovilca, considered himself ruler of all of the land and sought to subdue Cusco – superior because of its cultural history – through force. Uscovilca and his two captains set off in search for Viracocha Inca who had steadfastly refused to wage war nor take any others’ territory. After initially agreeing to submit to Uscovilca and his conquering force, Viracocha then determined that Uscovilca was arrogant and should not be submitted to so easily and thus fled the city to a refuge in a town called Calca. Viracocha’s son, Inca Yupanqui – possibly the most famous figure in the Inca lineage – disagreed with his father’s decision to leave and gathered a resistance force. It was stated that “Inca Yupanqui would die rather than agree to live in bondage.”¹²⁴ Ultimately, neither would have to be the case as Inca Yupanqui successfully repelled Uscovilca’s attempt to conquer Cusco and became Inca himself, marking a new age of Cusco warfare and rapid expansion.

Born in the early fifteenth century, Inca Yupanqui (also known as Pachacuti, the “earth shaker”) was the first and foremost Inca in territorial acquisition and began his reign in 1438. Tahuantinsuyu’s early expansion under his guidance encompassed the highland territories surrounding Cusco but he also conquered the highlands of northern Peru.¹²⁵ His new territories included, but were not limited to, Huarochiri, Canta, Tarama, Chinchacocha, Cajatambo, Bonbon, Conchucos, and Cajamarca.¹²⁶ Garcilaso de la Vega,

¹²³ Cobo, 131-2.

¹²⁴ Betanzos, 19-21.

¹²⁵ Burkholder, 19.

¹²⁶ Cobo, 138.

“El Inca,” started his account of what was considered “modern” Peruvian history with Cusco and the conquests of Inca Yupanqui.¹²⁷ However, the most detailed and glowing review of the imperialist Inca’s administration came from the Jesuit scholar Father Bernabe Cobo. Cobo wrote about Inca Yupanqui by stating,

This king was the most valiant and warlike, wise and statesmanlike of all the Incas, because he organized the republic with the harmony, laws, and statues that it maintained from that time until the arrival of the Spaniards. He injected order and reason into everything; eliminated and added rites and ceremonies; made the religious cult more extensive; established the sacrifices and the solemnity with which the gods were to be venerated[...] reformed the calendar; divided the year into twelve months, giving each one its name.¹²⁸

While many of these innovations have also been associated with previous Incas, what is important is that sixteenth century chroniclers saw Inca Yupanqui as the beginning of the greatness of Tahuantinsuyu. To indigenous chroniclers, mestizos, and Spanish Jesuit priests, Inca Yupanqui represented everything there was to admire about the Inca empire as both myth and history suggested that he had a hand in developing and reforming all sections of Inca culture and administration; the economy, the military, religion, science, and monumental architecture were all dramatically improved under his reign. All the while, Inca Yupanqui had successfully defended Cusco and expanded its rule further than all of the previous Incas had done combined.¹²⁹ His time as Inca also was noteworthy for the creation of the warrior class, inasmuch as his policy allowed non-Incas to enter the *orejones* status of warriors, allowing for a certain amount of social mobility within the subjugated ethnic groups and strengthening the military simultaneously. While the

¹²⁷ De la Vega, 61-73.

¹²⁸ Cobo, 133.

¹²⁹ It has been suggested by many that the first Inca, Manco Inca’s reign probably began in approximately 1000 C.E., making Inca Yupanqui’s thirty-three year reign more militarily successful than the previous four hundred and thirty eight years combined.

orejones' father must still be from Cusco, it was no longer necessary for his parents to be of nobility (or even to have parents at all).¹³⁰ Also during his reign, the Incas were finally able to pacify the Chancas during the Chanca revolt, a turning point in Inca history that many historians have suggested allowed the Incas to turn their military might outward from the empire.¹³¹

The last Inca to rule before the arrival of the Spaniards was Túpac Inca. Also known as Topa or Tupa Inca, Túpac was the eldest son of Inca Yupanqui and, like many Incas before him, started to reign before his father's death. His time as Inca began in roughly 1471 and lasted for twenty-three years, following in his father's footsteps by expanding the borders of Tahuantinsuyu during his rule.¹³² Allegedly, the military was so well-equipped from the time of his father and filled with war-savvy veterans that "very little was necessary" from Túpac in order to accomplish these goals.¹³³ While his father was elderly and confined to Cusco yet strong enough to be left alone, Túpac took his younger brother on an expedition to the northern reaches of the empire to continue the conquests well into modern day Ecuador, including the conquest of Quito. After three years on this conquest, Túpac and his brother received word from their father that he was ready to go join the Sun. They left many troops in Quito and established a governorship there, relocating *mitmaes* and strengthening the Kingdom of Quito which would lead to difficulties two generations later.¹³⁴ The rest of Túpac Inca's rule saw the improvement of infrastructure, deepening of administration, and the construction of monumental

¹³⁰ Betanzos, 60. Father Cobo also suggested that Inca Yupanqui was himself an *orejon* warrior by noting that his ears were pierced with "large earplugs in them," generally a sign of a member of the warrior class. This leads to further understanding of the Inca's attempts of the militarization of Tahuantinsuyu.

¹³¹ Cobo, 137.

¹³² Burkholder and Johnson, 19.

¹³³ Cobo, 142.

¹³⁴ Betanzos, 120.

architecture. Before he died, Túpac Inca also continued conquering territories to the north, eventually reaching the valley of Tumbes.¹³⁵

The story of Túpac's heir is, of course, surrounded in myth but is worth telling anyway and, perhaps, could contain some truth within it. It was said that Inca Yupanqui's son, Yamque Yupanqui, wished to name his successor before his father died in order to receive the wise ruler's blessing. While Yamque Yupanqui pondered the benefits of naming his son heir despite his tender age, the elder, retired Inca Yupanqui favored his new grandson born of Túpac Inca. This son was born from Túpac Inca and his *coya*, Mama Ocllo and was said to have exactly resembled his grandfather, Inca Yupanqui. Because this child was both conceived and delivered in the midst of a warzone, it was said that he would grow to be a great man and a powerful military leader. This Inca would grow up to be Huayna Capac.¹³⁶ While some have considered him the greatest Inca and others have considered him to be the last "true" Inca, Titu Cusi Yupanqui would have considered him to be "grandfather."

Bernabe Cobo and Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala both considered Huayna Capac to be the last of the "true Incas" although Guaman Poma did reserve some respect for Huayna Capac's unsuccessful son, Huáscar. Huayna Capac's role in the history is

¹³⁵ Cobo, 149-151. The history of Túpac Inca's reign also gives us examples of agency and social mobility during the time of Inca rule. A good example is the anecdote of Túpac and Guayro. Guayro was a commoner and such a beautiful woman that it was said that the Inca loved her even more than his own *coya*, or principal wife. He had a son with Guayro that he wished to ensure the son's well-being despite his illegitimacy. In order to do this, the Inca organized a game of *Ayllos*, a common game played in the Callao region at the time. He allowed all of the boys of knight age to participate, including his son, and ordered the game to be fixed for his benefit so that he would win. The son won not once but twice thanks to these benefits, yet the Inca's Council refused to give him the rewards demanded by the wager placed on the match as they feared that the Inca would not be a gracious loser. However, when the son demanded the province of Orcosuyo, the Inca agreed and the territory wound up being known as Aylloscas in memory of the game. Meanwhile, the *coya* whose role had diminished as a result of the Inca's love affair with Guayro sought to re-establish her authority in Cusco and received the right to "conquer" a rebellious town from a *cacica* after the leader did not cooperate with the Inca's local inspectors.

¹³⁶ Betanzos, 121.

frequently a conqueror of the south, as well as a builder of infrastructure. Huayna Capac expanded the system of roads found to exceed two thousand miles upon the arrival of the Spaniards, including, unsurprisingly, the two major thoroughfares that extended from the northern reaches of the empire down to modern day Chile and Argentina.¹³⁷ His abilities as a military leader were not short of even Inca Yupanqui as he further expanded Tahuantinsuyu's boundaries:

By the succession of the Incas, power devolved upon one of their number called Huayna Capac who won more lands, extended their sway more widely, and governed with greater justice and right than all the rest. He raised Peru to such a degree of political consciousness that one would have thought it impossible for an uncivilized and illiterate people to be governed with such regularity and order or to display such love and obedience towards its rulers.¹³⁸

Bigotry aside, Zarate's account clearly showed the unabashed admiration that history had given Huayna Capac's reign, despite the fact that his policies regarding succession were very significant factors in the downfall of Tahuantinsuyu. Huayna Capac died on campaign in Colombia sometime between Pizarro's initial expedition to South America and his arrival at Cajamarca, most likely due to smallpox introduced by Europeans that ravaged the continent. His son and appointed successor, Ninan Coyoche, also died, leaving a vacuum of power in Tahuantinsuyu that was claimed by rival powers.¹³⁹ Yet despite his appointment of Ninan Coyoche, Huayna Capac's treatment of his sons had created a fracturing, regionalized empire that allowed for local identity outside of Cusco. For example, ever since the conquest of Quito by Túpac Inca, the kingdom had grown in prestige. Huayna Capac's "legitimate" sons – all born from him and his *coya* – were all

¹³⁷ De la Vega, 82-3.

¹³⁸ Agustín de Zarate, *A History of the Discovery and Conquest of Peru, Books I-IV* (London: Penguin Press, 1973), 43.

¹³⁹ Burkholder, 62.

connected with Cusco but he also had fathered a son with the daughter of the king of Quito. This son, Atahualpa, would be treated as well (or better) than his Cusco counterparts and Huayna Capac went against tradition by informing Huáscar – his legitimate son in Cusco – that he would be portioning the Kingdom of Quito to Atahualpa after his death with the following speech:

Because I love your brother Atahuallpa very dearly and I regret to see him in poverty, I should be glad if you would consent that, of all the domains I have won for your crown, the inheritance and succession of the Kingdom of Quito – which belonged to his ancestors on his mother's side and would today have been his mother's – should be left to him so that he can live in royal estate as his virtues well merit [...] ¹⁴⁰

Following the death of Huayna Capac and his successor, Ninan Coyoche, the empire was divided between Atahualpa in Quito and Huáscar in Cusco.

A tentative peace between Huáscar and Atahualpa held for a few years following their father's death. The already strained relationship, however, became even more tenuous after Huáscar developed the desire to extend the borders of Tahuantinsuyu once more. His belief was that his kingdom had already conquered everything to the south and east as far as he could before reaching the wilderness of the Anti to the East (in the Amazon) but that, if he chose, Atahualpa could continue expanding his kingdom to the north and would one day surpass his own territory. ¹⁴¹ After demanding that Atahualpa pay him homage, Huáscar began to distrust his half-brother's intentions. Meanwhile, Atahualpa was being encouraged by his captains to refuse Huáscar's requests that he join Huáscar in Cusco. They persuaded him to take up the title of "King of Quito" and declare his sovereignty from the Inca in Cusco. However, despite this confrontational decision by Atahualpa, it was actually Huáscar who began the military aggressions, an

¹⁴⁰ De la Vega, 82.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, 90.

interesting decision as Atahualpa maintained control of most of the professional military in Quito. Huáscar used Atahualpa's bastardry as justification that the entire empire belonged to him and battle ensued at Tumibamba.¹⁴² The initial battle went in Huáscar's favor; it was so successful for the Cusco leader's military that they even captured Quito's Inca during the battle.¹⁴³ However, Atahualpa was able to escape from imprisonment, allegedly by drilling a hole in the prison wall with a silver bar smuggled in to him by a woman who was permitted to visit.¹⁴⁴ However the escape was managed, it led to Atahualpa's regrouping in Quito and the tide of the war turning in his favor. Ultimately, having Tahuantinsuyu's professional army made the difference as Atahualpa's "seasoned soldiers were each worth ten of their adversaries."¹⁴⁵ Whether or not Atahualpa won the war over Huáscar or was in the process of winning it during the fateful meeting at Cajamarca is open to some debate among historians as there were still many who were rebellious against Atahualpa, but Quito's Inca had captured Huáscar and sought his revenge against any that he knew or imagined had supported his brother. Every account of the era, whether from a Quechua, mestizo, or Spaniard painted a very horrific picture of Atahualpa's "purge" after he considered the war to be won. The half-Inca author Garcilaso de la Vega noted that after Atahualpa had captured Huáscar, he sent out messengers claiming to restore Huáscar to the throne and thus requested any Inca (male of royal blood) to appear in Cusco so that he could bestow upon them certain privileges in front of both kings. However, once they arrived, he had them all slaughtered in order

¹⁴² Cobo, 164-5.

¹⁴³ Burkholder and Johnson, 62-3.

¹⁴⁴ Cobo, 165. Pedro Pizarro claimed that the reason Atahualpa was able to escape was merely because "until midnight these Indians keep watch vigilantly, but from midnight onward they all go to sleep" and that Atahualpa was able to escape because of this lapse in security. Meanwhile, Atahualpa himself claimed that he turned into a snake and slithered through a hole in the wall.

¹⁴⁵ De la Vega, 93.

to prevent any future uprisings.¹⁴⁶ Father Cobo stated that Atahualpa was at Cajamarca at the time of Pizarro's arrival executing a horrible slaughter against those he perceived as loyal to Huáscar.¹⁴⁷ Atahualpa's cruelty would have strong consequences, however, as his particular viciousness against the Cañari ethnic group (that was known for its superior war-faring abilities and support of Huáscar) gave the Spaniards a ready-made and extremely formidable ally against Atahualpa. Stories of the Inca's cruelty against the Cañari include his ordered slaughter of Cañari children who had come to greet him with flowers and his burying of Cañari soldiers while they were still alive in order to "grow" formidable soldiers for himself.¹⁴⁸

While taking his revenge in Cajamarca, Atahualpa was contacted by Spanish messengers from Pizarro, who had learned of the civil war between the rival claimants. Pizarro was able to contact both parties through intermediaries and gather valuable information.¹⁴⁹ After Captain Hernando de Soto gave a speech of friendship to Atahualpa, Hernando Pizarro arrived to tell the Inca that "the governor [Francisco Pizarro] loved him dearly. If he had any enemy he should tell [Pizarro] and he would send to conquer that person."¹⁵⁰ Atahualpa replied that Pizarro and his men should prepare reparations for him as he would come to them the next day. While Pizarro planned for Atahualpa's arrival the next day, it was not reparations to show the Inca respect:

After dawn, the Marquis Don Francisco Pizarro arranged his troops, dividing the cavalry into two portions of which he gave the command of one to Hernando Pizarro and the command of the other to Hernando de

¹⁴⁶ De la Vega, 94-5.

¹⁴⁷ Cobo, 169.

¹⁴⁸ Betanzos, 213.

¹⁴⁹ Burkholder and Johnson, 63.

¹⁵⁰ Hemming, 35.

Soto. In like manner he divided the infantry, he himself taking one part and giving the other to his brother Juan Pizarro. At the same time, he ordered Pedro de Candia with two or three infantrymen to go with trumpets to a small fort which is in the plaza of Cajamarca and to station themselves there [...]¹⁵¹

Thus the Spanish soldiers were hidden around the plaza in Cajamarca awaiting Atahualpa's arrival. Once he arrived, Pizarro sent out a man of the cloth to read the Inca the *requerimiento*. After Fray Vicente approached Atahualpa in order to read him scripture, Atahualpa threw the book on the ground, either out of confusion or out of anger because of the disrespect shown to him by the Spaniards who had refused to drink the offering of *chicha*. Vicente then gave Pizarro the word that they had rejected Christianity and the Spaniards charged, firing their arquebuses and trampling Amerindians by the dozens.¹⁵² The massacre was so lopsided that no Spaniards died and rather than fight back, the forces of Atahualpa merely looked for places to flee, only to find none.¹⁵³ Atahualpa himself was captured and taken to Pizarro's lodging while the massacre in the square continued. Out of desperation, some of the indigenous threw themselves against the wall, knocking down a fifteen foot section of it in order to flee to the safety of the plain. However, they were pursued with fervor onto the plain and slaughtered. The death total was surely exaggerated in many accounts, but the general consensus is that approximately six or seven thousand defenseless Indians were killed in two hours.¹⁵⁴

After his capture by Pizarro's men, Atahualpa eagerly sought his release by promising to fill the room of his prison with gold and silver up to a drawn red line on "the condition that the jars, pitchers, and vats which he proposed to pile up as high as the line

¹⁵¹ Pizarro, 177-8.

¹⁵² Guaman Poma, 113-4.

¹⁵³ Cieza de León, 212.

¹⁵⁴ Hemming, 42-4.

should not be pressed down or broken.”¹⁵⁵ It has been argued that Atahualpa offered the “Room of Ransom” because he was under the belief that the Christians would depart from Peru after receiving precious metals. However, according to this school of thought, this sealed the fate of Peru as the millions in gold and silver that were gathered for the Spaniards only demonstrated the economic value of the future colony.¹⁵⁶ Atahualpa’s execution of his imprisoned rival, Huáscar, hastened his own future as he outlived his usefulness after repeated ransoms yielded diminishing returns. Atahualpa was sentenced to death by Pizarro and agreed to be baptized by Fray Vicente shortly before his execution. He kept asking the Spaniards what he had done to deserve the execution and was interrupted by the cleric in order to carry out the Inca’s sentence.¹⁵⁷ With Atahualpa’s death, the conquest of Peru was over, having benefitted from division and disease. However, the struggle for control and sovereignty was just beginning.

¹⁵⁵ Francisco López de Gómara, *Historia General de las Indias*, as found in Jose Durand, “La Biblioteca del Inca,” *Nueva Revista de filología hispánica* 2 (1948), 239-64.

¹⁵⁶ Burkholder and Johnson, 64.

¹⁵⁷ Cieza de León, 256-7.

Chapter IV

THE LINEAGE: MANCO INCA'S ROLE IN TITU CUSI'S HISTORY

“It is believed that, once [Manco Inca] is surrounded, he cannot fail to be killed or taken prisoner, and then order will be restored to the land. But until this is achieved, everything will remain in a state of suspense.”

-Unknown author¹⁵⁸

After an attempt by the Spaniards to install a “puppet ruler” failed with Túpac Hualpa’s premature death within two months of his coronation, most likely of smallpox.¹⁵⁹ He was replaced by Manco Inca, the father of Titu Cusi Yupanqui.¹⁶⁰ The agreement, in name only, was to have Indians serve the Spaniards while the Spaniards actually submitted to the “true ruler,” Manco Inca. However, these early negotiations for adequately splitting the empire were not successful due to a “want of interpreters.”¹⁶¹ Manco Inca was a smooth talker who allegedly was highly respected by his subjects. Garcilaso de la Vega claimed that Andeans actually transported Francisco Pizarro from city to city on their shoulders, allowing the conquistador to safely travel alone on perilous journeys out of love and respect for their Inca.¹⁶² However, the relationship between the indigenous ruler and the Spanish conquerors would quickly become strained as unrestrained greed would lead to the kidnapping of Manco Inca by the Pizarro brothers. Depending on which account of the story one believes, Manco Inca was kidnapped either

¹⁵⁸ *Relación del Sitio del Cuzco y Principio de las Guerras Civiles del Perú Hasta la Muerte de Diego de Almagro*, in *Colección de Libros Españoles Raros o Curiosos, Vol. 13* (Charleston: Nabu Press, 2012), 195.

¹⁵⁹ MacQuarrie, 138.

¹⁶⁰ Burkholder and Johnson, 65.

¹⁶¹ De la Vega, 113-4.

¹⁶² *Ibid*, 118.

once (as alleged by Garcilaso de la Vega) or three times (as alleged by Titu Cusi) so that the Pizarro brothers could obtain as much gold as their successful older sibling.

Regardless of the number of times that Manco Inca was held against his will, the end result manifested in a full scale rebellion by forces loyal to Manco Inca in a siege of Cusco in 1536. The motivation for the uprising is unclear. De la Vega alleged that the uprising was the result of a single kidnapping and that Manco Inca had orchestrated the rebellion with the use of *quipus* while under confinement.¹⁶³ Betanzos claimed that Manco rebelled after he realized that he was ruler of Tahuantinsuyu in name only and had lost his practical ability to govern. His account asserted that the Inca was able to organize a rebellion by promising Hernando Pizarro a “potbellied Indian of solid gold”.¹⁶⁴ Titu Cusi, meanwhile, claimed that the rebellion by Manco was the result of the Inca’s belief that the younger Pizarros’ behavior was disrespectful and disloyal to the Crown of Spain. Only after three kidnappings, ransoms, and demands for the Inca’s *coya* as a sexual prize was Manco Inca convinced of the necessity of rebellion.¹⁶⁵ Perhaps the most accurate way to ascertain Manco’s motivations is in the study of a letter written by one of Diego de Almagro’s messengers who allegedly relayed the Inca’s exact words to the forgotten Spanish governor:

How is it that the great lord from Castile orders that they seize my wives and take me prisoner with a chain around my neck and that they urinate on me and spit in my face? How is it that Gonzalo Pizarro, brother of the elder lord, stole my wife and has her still? And that Diego Maldonado threatened me and demanded gold, saying that he, too, was a lord?¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ De la Vega, 123-4.

¹⁶⁴ Betanzos, 280-2.

¹⁶⁵ Yupanqui, 128.

¹⁶⁶ Pedro de Oñate, “Your Sacred Majesty,” *Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de Chile* 5 (Santiago: 1889), 277. This is the same Pedro de Oñate that would later care for Titu Cusi when he lived in Spanish society.

While the letter seemed to reflect Manco Inca's frustration with Spanish claims of authority – especially while being contacted by a man in Almagro who claimed to be equal to Pizarro – there also contained an explanation for Manco's dissatisfaction in his own words with the Spaniards' occupation of Cusco. The siege of Cusco pitted perhaps as many as one hundred thousand Indians against fewer than two hundred Spaniards. Pedro Pizarro put the forces at forty thousand for the Inca and 190 for the Spaniards, although this number excluded Indian auxiliaries.¹⁶⁷ The attackers launched fire at their own city and watched it burn to the ground. The men defending the city were valiant in the face of almost certain death, and many of them would survive the event to go on to very notable ventures: Garcilaso, Sr., Ponce de León the younger, the younger Pizarro brothers, and Hernando de Soto were among those present in Cusco during the months-long siege.¹⁶⁸

Equally noteworthy were the men who were not present. Francisco Pizarro was not in the city at the time of the rebellion and, therefore, sought to send reinforcements for his brothers. His first attempt, sending fifty men led by his brother Captain Diego Pizarro was met with an ambush in the mountain passes and all of the Spaniards were killed. Another augmenting force led by Gonzalo de Tapia with eighty men also had a one hundred percent mortality rate. A third attempt led by Captain Morgovejo proved equally disastrous as the captain and most of his men died. Finally, Pizarro attempted to change his tactics by sending an Inca, Cusi Rimanchi, with his captain, Gaete, and forty men but, even then, all but Gaete's nephew were killed.¹⁶⁹ When all of the attempts

¹⁶⁷ Pizarro, 172-4.

¹⁶⁸ De la Vega, 126.

¹⁶⁹ Betanzos, 286.

failed, Pizarro wrote to the governor of Guatemala, Pedro de Alvarado, to apprise him of the situation:

Most Magnificent Sir: The Inca has the city of Cusco besieged and I have heard nothing about the Spaniards in it. The country is so badly damaged that no native chief now serves us and they have won many victories against us...It is causing me such great sorrow that it is consuming my entire life, as well as the fear of losing the governorship.¹⁷⁰

Pizarro's plea would not help and what ultimately proved successful was the arrival of an unlikely ally.

Also absent from the fighting was Pizarro's partner and rival, Diego de Almagro. Almagro was sent on campaign in Chile, a campaign that was designed by Pizarro to remove him from Peru and organized by Manco Inca to result in his death. Manco had convinced his brother Paulo to lead Diego de Almagro's party to their death in the Chilean Atacama Desert.¹⁷¹ Meanwhile, the situation was bleak for the Spaniards in Tahuantinsuyu's capital. Thirty were dead, nearly all of them were wounded, and the siege prevented Francisco Pizarro from sending in any method of healing said wounds. The Cañari auxiliaries were helping the Spaniards survive.¹⁷² Just when things were at a breaking point for the Spaniards, Almagro returned from his Chilean expedition. Seizing a potential opportunity to grab power, Almagro made his return a secret and contacted Manco instead of Pizarro as reinforcements. Almagro offered an alliance to the rebellious Amerindian leader but the latter rejected the offer, claiming that he would not ally with a Spaniard because his goal was to rid the empire of all Spaniards, not just the

¹⁷⁰ Francisco Pizarro, "Letter to Pedro de Alvarado," as found in Raúl Porras Barrenechea, *Cartas del Perú*, Letter 143 (Lima: 1959), 216-7.

¹⁷¹ Betanzos, 280-1.

¹⁷² De la Vega, 126.

Pizarro brothers. After refusing such a partnership, Manco Inca was forced to retreat from his siege of Cusco and retreat into the Peruvian *puna*, or “highlands.”¹⁷³

Manco Inca’s original retreat fell to Vitcos, a highland town that had been used as a vacation home for past Incas. The highlands of the *puna*, meaning “uninhabitably cold,” would not only have discouraged the Spaniards from climbing to such an altitude but, theoretically, would have given the Inca a tactical advantage by negating the use of the cavalry.¹⁷⁴ However, Almagro had finally captured Cusco and could now turn his attention on the rebel Indian community. No longer protected by the distractions that a Spanish civil war had provided him, Manco decided that his highland refuge was no longer defensible with the roughly four thousand men he had gathered.¹⁷⁵ The region supposedly contained mosquitos that were so thirsty that they would continue to drink a person’s blood until they burst or “roll off the arm and fall.”¹⁷⁶ The new, Neo-Inca stronghold would last for decades, through the reigns of Manco Inca and those of his sons, Sayri Túpac, Titu Cusi Yupanqui, and Túpac Amaru. During this time, the colonial government in Peru would make repeated gestures and negotiations for the surrender of Vilcabamba, the name of the new resistance state. It was highly undesirable for a significant region and population of Tahuantinsuyu to remain outside of the sphere of Spanish rule as the leaders of the conquest encountered significant discontent among the conquistadors due to the finite limitations of the *encomienda* grants. It was said that, “for in those days any Spaniard, even a poor soldier, thought all of Peru together too little for

¹⁷³ De la Vega, 129-30.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 116.

¹⁷⁵ MacQuarrie, 274.

¹⁷⁶ De la Vega, 116.

himself alone.”¹⁷⁷ The negotiations would secure the surrender of Sayri Túpac, convince Titu Cusi to sign a treaty, and even lead to the last Inca’s death. It is these negotiations, particularly those with Titu Cusi, that need to be examined in greater detail.

One of Titu Cusi’s main tools in arguing for a pardon and large return in his negotiations with the Spaniards was manipulating both the Spanish and Inca notions of legitimacy to rule. Since he was attempting to establish himself as the lone authority for negotiations, it became necessary for him to convince the Spaniards that he was the true ruler of Vilcabamba. Before Titu Cusi’s tenure at Vilcabamba, Inca Sayri Túpac’s negotiations resulted in the surrender of Sayri, yet the independent state lived on. After luring Sayri Túpac from the neo-Inca state yet failing to procure its capitulation, Spaniards were reluctant to enter negotiations with someone who did not have the authority to negotiate peace.¹⁷⁸ This was actually a legitimate fear by the Spaniards as by this point, observers noted that Vilcabamba seemed to have “more leaders than followers.”¹⁷⁹ In order to ratify the 1566 treaty of capitulation by Titu Cusi, witnesses were questioned in order to verify Titu Cusi’s right to rule.¹⁸⁰ His legitimacy was established sufficiently to placate the Spaniards with this investigation yet questions and doubts remained, prompting Titu Cusi to argue his lineage in his *relación*. More of his account of the Spanish conquest has to do with his father and his legitimacy than with any other single aspect of the time period. He either directly or indirectly addresses Manco Inca’s noble lineage as well as his own more than twenty times in this extremely short account. His account quickly opened with the statement that Manco Inca was

¹⁷⁷ De la Vega, 119.

¹⁷⁸ Nowack, 68.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 74.

¹⁸⁰ Edmundo Guillén Guillén, “Documentos inéditos para la historia de los Incas de Vilcabamba: La capitulación del gobierno español con Titu Cusi Yupanqui,” *Historia y Cultura* 10 (1977), 73-80.

ruling in Cuzco at the time of Pizarro's arrival and that he received word of their *entrada* by messenger from his "bastard" brother Atahualpa.¹⁸¹ This statement was arguing that Manco Inca was, in fact, legitimately ruling while the Spaniards met Atahualpa at Cajamarca which contradicted the popularly held belief that Atahualpa was either winning or had already won the civil war for succession. His argument for Manco Inca's right to rule was based on both Inca and Spanish notions of nobility. He manipulated these notions by acknowledging that Huáscar and Atahualpa were older than his father which would normally establish their legitimacy according to the Spanish concept of primogeniture. But these claims were destroyed by the shared Inca and Spanish notion of bastardry, that a noble status was enhanced by noble lineage from both parents:

Many days later, my uncle Atahuallpa was engaged in war and altercations with one of his brothers, Huáscar Inca, over the question of who was the rightful king of this land. In truth, neither one of them was the legitimate heir, for they had only usurped the power from my father, who was still a boy then[...][A]lthough both were sons of Huayna Capac, their mothers were commoners, whereas my father had pure royal blood.¹⁸²

This dialectic from Titu Cusi was very manipulative with the things he chose to say, how he chose to say them, and what he chose to omit. First, he played on the Spanish notion of loyalty to a ruler. Several times in his account, Titu Cusi declared loyalty to the king of Spain either from himself or his father. This statement exalts this virtue and portrays Manco Inca's brothers as betrayers and usurpers. This concept of minor nobility plotting to usurp the throne from the legitimate ruler would have resonated strongly with the King Don Philip. Secondly, he focused on a relatable principle for the Spaniards, that noble sons from peasant mothers were not legitimate rulers. Sixteenth-century Spaniards had a very similar concept of inheritance with bastard children with the blood of the mother

¹⁸¹ Yupanqui, 59.

¹⁸² Ibid, 61.

being of utmost importance. The villain of Titu Cusi's history of the conquest, Juan Pizarro, showed that very explicitly in his will when he left nothing to his mistress or his daughter by saying that he would leave nothing to the Indian woman "who has given birth to a girl whom I do not recognize as my daughter."¹⁸³ Similarly, it was considered "degrading for a member of a wealthy family to enter into a kinship relation with a person of lower status."¹⁸⁴ Yet despite these values they held in common, what Titu Cusi chose to omit for strategic purposes is an explanation of Inca concepts of bastardry and how they differ from Spanish ones. In order for his father to have "pure royal blood," it would have been necessary for Manco Inca's parents to have been closely related. The highest nobility that an Inca son could obtain would be if he was the child of an Inca and the Inca's *coya*, which means sister-wife.¹⁸⁵ This practice was known in Spanish government and even tolerated to a certain extent yet Titu Cusi must have thought it wise to not bring attention to the fact that he was claiming his father was of the highest nobility due to being born to a brother and sister, nor does he draw attention to this practice at any time he mentions *coyas* in his account. And finally, this statement drew on recent precedent which made his story seem more plausible. He claimed that his father had warring factions attempting to rule in his stead due to his young age. This could easily have been confirmed during the period as a common practice as Titu Cusi and his predecessor, Sayri Túpac, were both results of said tradition. Their younger

¹⁸³ Hemming, 199. It is a very interesting choice by Titu Cusi to portray Juan Pizarro as the particular villain in his account, if only because Juan died during the Siege of Cusco in 1536 and was, therefore, unable to defend himself. As these quotes by Juan published in both Hemming and MacQuarrie also indicate, he would likely not have found defenders of his reputation in his Indian girlfriend nor mestizo children.

¹⁸⁴ Spalding, "Social Climbers," 654.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 645-664. Interestingly enough, it appears as though the custom of *coya* marriage was not as deep as the Inca may have had the Spaniards believe. According to Father Bernabe Cobo's account, the system of *coya* marriage in order to preserve the purity of the bloodline only began with the children of Túpac Inca, immediately before the Spaniards' arrival.

brother, Túpac Amaru, would have been the most legitimate heir to the throne if not for his age.¹⁸⁶ Where primogeniture strayed from Spain's notions of legitimacy, Titu Cusi did well to omit it from the history as well. As previously mentioned, portraying Atahualpa and Huáscar as usurpers would have played well on a European monarch's concern for disloyalty and betrayal. But it is also worth noting that even if it were true that Atahualpa and Huáscar were not the chosen sons for succession, it would not have necessarily legitimized Manco Inca's rule and, by consequence, Titu Cusi's. The Inca had a precedence set where the throne could be taken through sheer force or competence regardless of legitimacy. Titu Cusi did not mention in his account that Inca Yupanqui had been passed over by his father, Inca Viracocha, who had named another son as heir. Not only was Inca Yupanqui able to assume leadership after his victory in the Chancas War that had forced his father and brother to retreat but the reign of this "illegitimate" son would result in some of the most successful years for the Inca as it marked the beginning of Tahuantinsuyu's massive expansion.¹⁸⁷

At this time, it is worth noting a bit of Titu Cusi's childhood background. The young Inca had grown up in Spanish society until he was about twelve years old in the household of Pedro de Oñate, a man of a wealthy colonial family. During that time, he received a preliminary education and was exposed to Spanish culture.¹⁸⁸ While documentation cannot be found that confirms nor denies such a postulation, it is not completely unreasonable to suggest that perhaps Titu had read or heard about the letters from Cortés to the Spanish Crown on behalf of the children of Moctezuma II, either while he lived in Spanish society or after his return to the Neo-Inca state his father had founded.

¹⁸⁶ Nowack, 69.

¹⁸⁷ Spalding, *Huarochiri*.

¹⁸⁸ Bauer, 14-5.

As previously mentioned, such an infamous event in Spanish America would have set a powerful precedent for Titu's claims on the grounds of royal legitimacy.¹⁸⁹ However, Spanish legalism would require a legal basis for such claims, so one can consider Titu Cusi's *relación* to be the making of a legal statement for potential later litigation.

One reason it may have been necessary to place such an emphasis on his own legitimacy is that at no point has Titu Cusi's right to rule been without dispute, which would have been disastrous for someone negotiating for property and an income based on his nobility. The Spanish chronicler Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa stated that Titu Cusi himself was a bastard.¹⁹⁰ He went so far as to attempt to convince Viceroy Francisco de Toledo that there was no true Inca left. Juan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti-Yamqui Salcamaygua's *relación* saw Atahualpa's reign as legitimate regardless of accusations from "An Inca Account" that argued that everyone recognized Manco Inca as true ruler despite the civil war. It stated that "triumphant songs were sung after augury showed that Atahualpa would rightly take the throne after defeating his half-brother Huáscar in military conflict."¹⁹¹ Diego Rodríguez de Figueroa, who visited Titu Cusi shortly before the capitulation also questioned the legitimacy of the Inca but also went a step further when he suggested that Atahualpa's children (particularly those of Atahualpa and his *coya*) were the true heirs to be Inca.¹⁹² The Inca's response to such criticism was that Atahualpa was a bastard and that the legitimate ruler was the Spanish ally Huáscar, who was then followed by his father.¹⁹³ However, even many historians also question his

¹⁸⁹ Chipman, 85.

¹⁹⁰ Sarmiento, 160, 169, 193.

¹⁹¹ Juan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti-Yamqui Salcamaygua, *Relacion de antigüedades deste reyno del Piru*, Cusco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de Las Casas," 1993.

¹⁹² Nowack, 68.

¹⁹³ Titu Cusi's claim in "An Inca Account", as perhaps the reader remembers, was that both Huáscar and Atahualpa were bastards and only his father had a legitimate claim to the throne in Cuzco. However, this

legitimacy.¹⁹⁴ This is perhaps one reason why Titu Cusi has been neglected in the history books. Indigenous chronicler Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala did not think it important to mention Titu Cusi at all.¹⁹⁵ Francisco de Jérez, one of the first Spaniards to enter Tahuantinsuyu would have witnessed firsthand the events of Titu Cusi's *relación* yet recorded them differently. Rather than hearing from the subjects of the Empire that the "real" ruler was back in Cuzco as Titu Cusi's account claimed, Jérez acknowledged Atahualpa as the ruler of the new lands the Spaniards had just entered:

[...]In the midst of whom[the Spaniards] came Atahuallpa in a litter lined with multicolored parrot feathers and decorated with gold and silver plates. The ruler was borne on the shoulders of many men and behind him came two more litters and two hammocks containing persons of importance, who were followed by many more who wore gold and silver crowns.¹⁹⁶

Even uncontested Inca lineages have had challenges in historical literature. Juan de Betanzos did not consider Túpac Inca to be the true heir of Inca Yupanqui, rather merely a sidekick to Yamque Yupanqui that was only later named a *capac* out of necessity because of the youth of potential heirs.¹⁹⁷ As previously mentioned, Betanzos also left out the early Inca, Inca Capac Yupanqui. Unquestionably, the witness that damaged Titu Cusi's claim of inheritance was Titu Cusi himself. In a letter to Polo de Ondegardo, corregidor of Cuzco, Titu Cusi admitted that he was not the lawful ruler of Vilcabamba when he said "*que el Inga mi señor y hermano Topa Amaro es el Inga recta y verdaderamente por derecha línea según que nuestro padre y señor Mango Inga*

acknowledgement of Huáscar as being of correct lineage is going to be important later as we examine Titu Cusi's manipulation of Spanish alliances and conflicts.

¹⁹⁴ See Ralph Bauer, and Karen Spalding's "Social Climbers."

¹⁹⁵ Guamán Poma.

¹⁹⁶ Spalding, *Huaro chirí*, 72.

¹⁹⁷ Betanzos, 115-125.

Yupangui lo dejó ordenado y mandado.”¹⁹⁸ In this sentence, he not only conceded that Túpac Amaru was the most legal heir but also that it was what his father, Manco Inca, had wanted (despite his claims to the contrary in his *relación*). Titu Cusi’s version of succession was reiterated frequently in negotiations with the Spaniards and was supposedly “widely known.”¹⁹⁹ Yet it is important to note that his claims for legitimacy were dynamic and therefore could not have associated Titu Cusi with any one particular viewpoint. In his *relación*, he claimed that he was always the legitimate ruler of Vilcabamba yet in debate with Diego Rodríguez and also following Sayri Túpac’s peace negotiations, Titu Cusi claimed that Túpac Amaru was the true ruler of Vilcabamba.²⁰⁰ In the end, all of Titu Cusi’s skillful pandering paid off as peace negotiations that were conducted with him were a *de facto* recognition of his rule in Vilcabamba.

To the penultimate Inca, establishing his lineage’s royalty was important not only to augment his own authority to negotiate with the Spaniards but it also provided a connection between his family and Spain that he could draw upon. This connection was an important one to establish as it was difficult to request preferential treatment from the very monarch in Europe that his father had so successfully revolted against. Yet for Titu Cusi, his father’s royalty was a common bond to these *virocochas* that had entered his

¹⁹⁸ Guillén, 84.

¹⁹⁹ Nowack, 69.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, 68. Titu Cusi frequently either skipped over his brother Sayri Túpac’s rule or discredited him by claiming that he did not have the noble lineage that Titu Cusi had. This appears to be historically inaccurate as well because it has been suggested that Sayri Túpac’s mother was Cura Ocllo who was *coya* (sister-wife) to Manco Inca which would therefore make Sayri Túpac as noble as one could be. However, Sayri Túpac’s lineage is not clear due to the circumstances surrounding Cura Ocllo’s death which will be touched upon later in this paper.

empire, not a source of conflict.²⁰¹ He claimed that Manco Inca was immediately loyal to the foreign visitors and established a friendship with Francisco Pizarro:

When the two Spaniards arrived at the place where the Marquis Don Francisco Pizarro was staying with the messengers and the news that my father had send, the marquis, whom we used to call *macho capitu*, was assured that my father, Manco Inca Yupanqui, was the true king of the entire land—the one who was respected, feared, and recognized as such by all—while Atahuallpa, his older brother, ruled the land as a tyrant[...]However, as it turned out later, Atahuallpa did not escape the punishment that he deserved.²⁰²

In addition to Titu Cusi's adroit ability to insert yet another claim of his father's right to rule, this section of his account also establishes two other points to the king of Spain; it marks the beginning of the alleged deep friendship between Francisco Pizarro and his father (a friendship that will be discussed in the following chapter) and it also sets the tone for the rest of Titu Cusi's account. Unlike other indigenous accounts of the Spanish conquest, this one would not criticize all of Spain's behavior and actions when they subjugated the Andean people. On the contrary, Titu Cusi saw the assassination of Atahualpa after his kidnapping and ransom by the conquistadors as justifiable. It is possible that Manco Inca and Titu Cusi saw Atahualpa's death as desirable because it eliminated a rival claimant to the throne.²⁰³ Yet its main purpose was the absolution of Manco Inca's actions. Despite all of Titu Cusi's political abilities, he knew he would be unable to distance himself from his father and the rebellion while he ruled Vilcabamba. The next best thing, in that case, would be to explain why Manco Inca should not been

²⁰¹ Yupanqui, 60. *Viracocha* means "Lord" in Quechua, the language of the Inca. It is the term that Titu Cusi repeatedly stated that his father used to address and describe the conquistadors.

²⁰² Ibid, 66-67.

²⁰³ Nowack, 59.

seen as a rebel against the king. To do so, Titu Cusi needed both Spaniards as allies and as scapegoats.

Chapter V

THE ALLIES: FRANCISCO PIZARRO AND LOPE GARCIA DE CASTRO IN TITU

CUSI'S NEGOTIATIONS

“Taking in his [Challicuchima’s] hands another stone, as heavy a one as he could lift, he hit the first cacique upon the head with it, and as he had a soft head, the blow flattened it out like a tortilla. And thus he wished to do to all the rest of the caciques. Hearing of this piece of cruelty, the Marquis sent straightway to order that it be carried no further.”

-Pedro Pizarro²⁰⁴

Francisco Pizarro, “El Señor Gobernador,” was the illiterate son of an *hidalgo* from eastern Extremadura. His father was a captain but the legitimacy of Francisco’s own birth is unclear as he had an investigation into his own lineage in 1529. It seems to be the case that his father never legally recognized him, a possibility that is supported by the fact that his brothers were able to achieve a respectable level of literacy.²⁰⁵ While Pedro Pizarro was understandably biased, many accounts of the conquest of Peru make it appear as though Francisco Pizarro was strongly against blatant cruelty towards Indians (or at least Indian nobles). The story above is an excerpt about an indigenous captain allied with Pizarro who wished to seek revenge against caciques who had opposed him. Pizarro initially had told the captain, “Do whatever you wish,” until he found out that what the captain wished was to literally crush all noble opposition to him. He could also be found shirking the duties of his office to go out and reap wheat in the fields with

²⁰⁴ Pizarro, 230.

²⁰⁵ James Lockhart, *Men of Cajamarca* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), 135-41.

Indians. He also took at least two Indian mistresses, as Spanish conquistadors were known to do, but Pizarro cohabitated with the daughter of Huayna Capac for years until her manipulation of Pizarro to murder her sister got her married to another Spaniard.²⁰⁶

Titu Cusi, as previously mentioned, sought to establish a strong relationship between Francisco Pizarro and Manco Inca based on mutual respect and love. The positive reception of Pizarro's execution of Atahualpa by his father, Manco Inca, reinforced that relationship.²⁰⁷ Even Atahualpa's speech that aimed at fomenting rebellion aggrandized the relationship between the two leaders from an early state when he stated that "these people who have entered our lands hold notions contrary to our own and have aligned themselves with my brother Manco Inca and seem to live in great harmony with him."²⁰⁸

Atahualpa's attempted rebellion only strengthened the bond between the marquis and the Inca, according to Titu Cusi. A general of Atahualpa's revolt, Quisquis, was able to attack the Spaniards with a large force. The account says that "[t]hus, the marquis and his people were forced to proceed with great caution, because their pursuers were so numerous that they could advance only by suffering great troubles and damages. They constantly had to defend themselves against the overwhelming attacks."²⁰⁹ This propaganda by Titu Cusi portrayed the Spaniards' success only as the result of the generosity of his father. He was reminding the king of the "great troubles and damages" that Manco Inca was able to spare Spain, not only in the initial rebellion but also after the initial attack had granted Quisquis some sense of autonomy. This point was actually

²⁰⁶ Lockhart, 146-52.

²⁰⁷ Yupanqui, 68. Titu Cusi argued that Atahualpa was assassinated not because he had outlived his usefulness to the Spaniards but because he was plotting against Manco Inca and the Spaniards which, to Titu Cusi, was a rebellion against a single alliance.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 68.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 69.

inadvertently supported by many of the conquistador's accounts. By aggrandizing the danger or framing it in a way that maximized the conquest's difficulty, the conquistador's put themselves in a position to gain the most from the Crown for their role in such a perilous mission. Pedro Pizarro's account described the conquest as nearly "impossible" and stated that, in those days, it would have been "impossible to get together even five hundred Spaniards on account of the evil reputation which the country had."²¹⁰ This, unwittingly, played into Titu Cusi's hands.

For days, Titu Cusi's father personally went out in order to find Quisquis to end his rebellion and punish him for his treason. The account of this by Titu was an attempt to minimize Manco Inca's own rebellion; by putting it in this context, the reader would see Manco Inca as a lover of justice and not one of senseless rebellion and blind hatred of the bearded Europeans. In fact, his account portrays his father as having great love of the Iberians by continuing to aggrandize the fledging friendship between Pizarro and Manco Inca. On one page, he mentioned the letters that Pizarro sent to his father during his campaign for Quisquis that told the Inca how lonely Pizarro was without his good friend nearby. Titu Cusi then showed the friendship as reciprocal while emphasizing his father's compassion and generosity—as well as his determination to get justice for those who rebelled against the Spaniards—when he said "because of his love for the marquis, my father began his return but not before having sent emissaries to all the parts where the traitor might be hiding in order to fight and kill him."²¹¹ The reciprocity and generosity of Manco Inca was then immediately reiterated when Titu Cusi claimed that his father

²¹⁰ Pizarro, 199.

²¹¹ Yupanqui, 72.

implored his Spanish friends to stay with him after he had given them a large amount of treasure.²¹²

Francisco Pizarro was fifty-seven years old at the time of Manco Inca's insurgency and certainly had many pro-Indian stories surrounding him. While his conquistadors were known for "eating their [Indians'] corn, robbing them of all their gold and silver, taking their wives...keeping many Indians chained and making slaves of them..."²¹³, Francisco was known for having an aversion to cruelty. Pizarro first ordered the conquistadors not to harm or extort any Indian residence that had a cross on it, in accordance with Spanish law.²¹⁴ However, he was also known for mediating in indigenous disputes for royalty in order to maintain stability.²¹⁵ The officer also went above and beyond the law, admonishing conquistadors who took a swing at Indians for touching their beards or by saving Atahualpa's life in the massacre at Cajamarca:

[...] whom they killed there in his litter, and the same fate would have been Atahualpa's had not the Marquis been there [...] Out of weariness, a Spaniard made as if to give Atahualpa a blow with a knife in order to kill him, and the Marquis Don Francisco Pizarro prevented it, and by his prevention the Marquis received a wound in the hand from the Spaniard who wished to slay Atahualpa.²¹⁶

²¹² Yupanqui, 73. This idea of reciprocity is one that repeatedly shows itself in Titu Cusi's work. It is an important concept to Andean people that governs social relationships. His frequent exploitation of the notion is used both to show Spanish ignorance of Andean customs and culture and also to later establish a justification for Manco Inca's rebellion. At the first meeting between Atahualpa and Spaniards, the account states that Atahualpa gave the emissaries an important, traditional drink and the diplomats offended him greatly by pouring it out. This is seemingly the only example in which Titu Cusi used an exclusively South American concept in his appeal to the Spanish king. It is reasonable to surmise, however, that Titu Cusi's time growing up in Spanish society may have taught him that there are similar concepts in Christianity, most notably the Golden Rule. For more on the Tahuantinsuyu practice of reciprocity, see Steve Stern's *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640*.

²¹³ MacQuarrie, 317.

²¹⁴ Pizarro, 161.

²¹⁵ MacQuarrie, 170.

²¹⁶ Pizarro, 185.

Manco and Pizarro definitely developed some form of close relationship during their counterinsurgent campaigns against Quisquis, Atahualpa's former General. Garcilaso de la Vega was the first to suggest, however, that the closeness with which Pizarro kept Manco was merely shrewd policy meant to "keep your enemies close."²¹⁷ This is more than likely as it is difficult to accept Pizarro's policy of sparing Atahualpa's life as altruistic when it took place in Cajamarca where six or seven thousand Indians were slaughtered. Similarly, Hemming suggested that the relationship only evolved into a close friendship as a political maneuver to outwit the other to gain "total control of the country."²¹⁸ However, de la Vega also acknowledged the closeness between the two leaders as Pizarro was able to travel safely throughout Peru on Manco's request, as previously mentioned.

Yet despite all of the accounts that indicate a mutually beneficial relationship, it does not appear to have been as loving as Titu Cusi would have had the king believe. Kim MacQuarrie wrote, "One thing all three brothers had agreed upon before Hernando's departure, however, was that Manco Inca must be exterminated. As long as the rebel emperor remained alive, then Manco would permanently endanger their control of Peru."²¹⁹ Similarly, while Pedro Pizarro wrote that Francisco did not wish to execute Atahualpa and only did so with great regret, a later anecdote also indicated that he had little reluctance to kill indigenous royalty or those close to Manco if it suited him:

[In response to Manco's killing of Spanish messengers] In his anger, the Marquis ordered that the wife of Manco Inca be killed. Some Cañaris tied her to a stake and then beat her and shot arrows at her until she died. The Spaniards who were present said that this Indian woman never spoke a

²¹⁷ De la Vega, 120-1.

²¹⁸ Hemming, 141.

²¹⁹ MacQuarrie, 319.

word nor uttered a single complaint, and in this manner she died from the beating and from the arrows they shot into her.²²⁰

The treatment of Manco Inca's *coya* is a central theme in Titu Cusi's *relación* that will be discussed in a later chapter, but it is worth noting that in his *relación*, Titu Cusi does not blame Francisco Pizarro for this act as it would not have benefited him for his father to have appeared at odds with the Marquis as well.

Another important ally of Titu Cusi's was the provisional governor and president of the Council at Lima, Lope García de Castro. If an intermediary were necessary for indigenous royalty to obtain what they felt like they deserved like when Moctezuma II's heirs used Cortés, Titu Cusi's was García de Castro. Shortly after being named governor, Castro sought to gain Titu Cusi's surrender through diplomatic means and conciliatory gestures. This certainly would have played into the Inca's hands as he was seeking rather sizable economic gains. The two frequently exchanged letters and when Titu Cusi finally accepted baptism, he chose a Christian name that would honor the governor, Diego de Castro.²²¹ Whether such flattery was sincere or the intention of political manipulation is irrelevant. What is important is that Titu Cusi had a much-needed ally in Peruvian politics and a powerful one at that. Peninsular Spaniards were already waning as a percentage by the second half of the sixteenth century and were actually outnumbered by American-born colonists by mid-century, mere decades after the settlement of Peru.²²² However, rather than granting the possibility of friendship between these two men or even claiming that Titu Cusi was skillfully manipulating the Spanish governor, many

²²⁰ Pizarro, 346.

²²¹ Bauer, 14-5.

²²² Burkholder and Johnson, 101.

instead were simply critical of the governor's credulousness and indecisiveness, relegating the Inca once again to a passive player in history.

Despite the cordial relationship that Titu Cusi and Lope García de Castro maintained, it is unlikely that either of the men trusted the other. Castro already warned the Crown of rumors that Titu Cusi had been fomenting rebellion in Chile and Argentina when even more dangerous information about the Inca reached him: located in a thatched building, rebels had built a secret arms factory with tens upon tens of thousands of weapons. The swords, bows, pikes, and axes were all being built for the occasion of surprising the Spaniards during the Holy Week celebrations, when they would be at their most vulnerable. It became clear to the governor that those working in the factory were in close contact with the Inca leader of Vilcabamba. However, it was during that time that more allies of Titu Cusi proved their worth. Sympathetic Augustinian friars and a captured *kuraka* got the *kuraka* in front of the governor to argue that the weapons were being manufactured as surprise contributions to the Spanish military. While he did not believe the story, Castro accepted it and focused on preventing such instances in the future.²²³ During the negotiations, Titu Cusi made it clear to his governor pen pal that any surrender would be contingent upon his son, Quispe Titu, marrying his cousin, Beatriz Clara Coya. Yet after this was agreed upon, the Spaniards that were housing the young *palla* decided to marry one of their own, Cristóbal Maldonado to her and had him rape her to consummate the marriage.²²⁴ When this plot was discovered, the Archbishop of Lima stated that Maldonado “has scandalized the Indians, Sayri-Túpac’s relatives, and

²²³ Hemming, 305-7.

²²⁴ The word *palla* is the female equivalent of *Inca*, “one of royal blood.” Beatriz would not have been a *coya* as Quispe Titu was not her brother nor were they yet married. Its closest western equivalent would be “princess.”

even more the Inca who has succeeded him.”²²⁵ Afterwards, Castro and Titu Cusi formalized the agreement in the Capitulation of Acobamba, signed by Titu on the 24th of August, 1566, nearly four months after the young girl’s rape.²²⁶

The Inca and his father certainly enjoyed the benefits of relationships with various Spaniards, both in military and civilian society. Whether these relationships were truly based on love and sincere friendship is doubtful but it is certainly true that they were successful as they were based on mutual respect. Titu Cusi took advantage of a new governor who was described as “conscientious” and “diplomatic,” just as his father had taken advantage of a relationship with the Spanish governor Pizarro in a mutually exploitative relationship.²²⁷ Regardless of the reasons, Titu Cusi was able to use these relationships much in the same way that Moctezuma II’s heirs used relationships in central Mexico for personal gain.

²²⁵ “Letter to the King,” Archbishop Loayza to King, Lima, 1 May 1566, MP 2 86.

²²⁶ It is certainly worth noting that John Hemming found that Lope García de Castro had written to the Crown out of fear that Maldonado would obtain the *palla*’s inheritance, stating that he would have far too much influence in Cusco. It is certainly possible that incident was a political ploy in order to remove Maldonado’s influence, particularly since Titu Cusi did not seem to be scandalized by the incident as the Archbishop had worried.

²²⁷ Hemming, 302.

Chapter VI

THE SCAPEGOATS: REBEL SPANIARDS IN A CHAOTIC VICEROYALTY

“Hernando had too many enemies by now, Francisco believed, who could poison the king’s ear and who could thus turn the king against Hernando and the rest of the Pizarro family.”

*-The Last Days of the Incas*²²⁸

Titu Cusi Yupanqui had to be extremely clever in order to absolve his father of the guilt associated with rebelling against the Crown. Rebellions were not uncommon in colonial South America and, as such, they were not taken lightly. However, Titu Cusi knew that, in the right circumstances, such transgressions could be forgiven if portrayed in a positive light. During the Spanish conquest, for example, the indigenous leader Chile Masa rebelled and caused a lot of grief for the Spaniards but later surrendered and was given a full pardon for his actions.²²⁹ While many men were executed for their roles in the rebellion against the Crown following the New Laws of 1542, the civil wars of the period were often treated as such: domestic struggles between men that were all still under the control of the monarchy.

Perhaps the most relevant uprising by Spaniards during the sixteenth century in Peru was the civil war between Diego de Almagro and Francisco Pizarro’s factions. Tensions between the two had been escalating ever since Pizarro came back from Spain with the sole grant of governorship of Peru, rather than a three person junta. However,

²²⁸ MacQuarrie, 318.

²²⁹ Pizarro, 163.

ever since Almagro had returned from Chile without a kingdom of his own, the relationship had gotten even worse. The reader will remember that when he returned from his campaign to the south, Almagro solicited an agreement with the rebelling Manco Inca in order to take Cusco for himself. While the account is slightly bias in Almagro's favor by claiming him as the original governor of Peru, indigenous chronicler Guaman Poma's account succinctly recapped the absurdity of the violence:

Don Francisco Pizarro, pursuing his own interests in the conquest, killed Don Diego de Almagro the elder. Don Francisco Pizarro then rose up as governor of this kingdom. Don Diego de Almagro the younger, mestizo, then killed Don Francisco Pizarro and rose up as governor of the land [...] Don Francisco Pizarro died, and Don Diego de Almagro the younger, mestizo, was killed by Don Gonzalo Pizarro, who rose up as governor of the land.²³⁰

However, the violence between these particular participants did not even end there. Hernando de Soto, who was present during the Siege of Cusco, used the opportunity with a vacuum of leadership to attempt to revolt and take Cusco for himself.²³¹ When that proved unsuccessful, and the civil war between the Pizarrists and Almagrists ensued, the New Laws of 1542 only exacerbated the internecine bloodshed. The New Laws were the attempt to curb the power of the *encomenderos* in Peru, maximize profit, and punish the participants in the Pizarro/Almagro war. Blasco Núñez Vela, the colony's first viceroy, brought them to Peru and the seemingly overly harsh restrictions for *encomenderos* allowed Gonzalo Pizarro to undertake a revolution of his own. Núñez Vela fled Lima and tried to raise an army in what is now Ecuador in 1544. Gonzalo Pizarro's forces

²³⁰ Guaman Poma, 135-7.

²³¹ Pizarro, 236.

tracked the viceroy down, however, and murdered him in 1546. Pizarro became the governor of Peru and killed at least 340 people whom he suspected of disloyalty.²³²

The rebellions in Peru would not end there, however. In 1553, Francisco Hernández Girón revolted against the crown in response to the second viceroy of Peru. His revolution was also particularly bloody. In the final battle, Girón lost two hundred soldiers and then he fled. In the end, he was caught and brought to Lima for his crimes.²³³ This particular rebellion would be important in the case of Titu Cusi for two main reasons. First of all, Vilcabamba had to be forgotten about while the Spaniards dealt with their internal matters, allowing the Incas to build up their strength and regroup.²³⁴ Second of all, Girón's land was in a very prosperous location. That area housed the palaces of the former ruler, Inca Yupanqui.²³⁵ This was important because his estates, particularly Jaquijahuana, were "Peru's richest encomiendas" and were among the estates that were granted to Sayri Túpac in his negotiations for surrender and – following his death – then offered to Titu Cusi.²³⁶ At the same time, another armed struggle against the colonial administration was occurring with indigenous support in the Amazon. A group of conquistadors accompanied the nobleman Pedro de Ursúa in a search for the mythical city of El Dorado in 1559 but a mutiny resulted in the murder of Ursúa and the proclamation of war by the new leader, Fernando de Guzmán. Guzmán was named because he was of nobility but he was merely the face of the operation that was actually being run by a commoner, Lope de Aguirre who felt disenfranchised in Peru. Aguirre's plan was to eventually seize Panama, Peru, and the Amazon but low

²³² Burkholder and Johnson, 68.

²³³ Guaman Poma, 137-8.

²³⁴ Cobo, 179.

²³⁵ De la Vega, 71.

²³⁶ Hemming, 294.

morale combined with his brutal tactics led to high desertion rates and his expedition ended by the time he reached Margarita Island off the coast of modern-day Venezuela. Aguirre then murdered his own daughter in order to keep her from falling into colonial hands which was too much for his party to take as they rose up against him to murder him as well.²³⁷

As shown by Titu Cusi's attempts to attach himself to important Spanish leaders, the Inca was a shrewd observer of Spanish politics. This ability would allow him to find a scapegoat for his father's rebellion while absolving his father of any responsibility and maintaining his strong loyalties to Spain and friendships with conquistadors that would prove to be necessary in negotiating a large return. The scapegoats that would be blamed for the rebellion and creation of the Vilcabamba state would be the much-hated Pizarro brothers: Hernando, Juan, and Gonzalo. Hernando was approximately thirty years of age during the time of Cajamarca and the eldest legitimate son of the Pizarro family. It has previously been noted that by the time of Vilcabamba's existence, Hernando had quite an extensive list of enemies. He was known, even among Indians, for his contempt of Spanish subordinates.²³⁸ He was said to have manipulated Peru's government through Francisco from behind the scenes and the king would receive frequent complaints about his control in colonial administration. As he held on to the air of superiority that accompanied him as one of the only nobles in the conquest, as well as one of the only military men who had seen European action, he could not stop the constant vitriol that would be so divisive among the Spaniards:

Hernando loosed insults on all who crossed him. The choicest were reserved for Almagro, his rival for Francisco Pizarro's favor, and his exact

²³⁷ Burkholder and Johnson, 76-7.

²³⁸ MacQuarrie, 272.

antithesis, since Almagro was a creature of the Indies, with no visible social origins in Spain. On more than one occasion Hernando referred to Almagro as a circumcised Moor [...] Hernando insulted Captain Alonso de Alvarado by openly reminding him of a humiliating rout he had suffered at Abancay. He called the Council of Cuzco a bunch of peasants and asked for a stick to make them obey his orders.²³⁹

It is stories like these that makes one understand so easily why the Pizarro brothers were worried that one of Hernando's enemies might try to "poison the King" against them.

However, Juan and Gonzalo were easy targets as well. Juan, as it has been noted, was killed in the Siege of Cuzco and, therefore, would not be able to defend himself.

Gonzalo, meanwhile, not only actively participated in the Pizarro/Almagro civil war but was the leader of the rebellion following the New Laws of 1542. He was described as a "firebrand" and that he suggested to the Pizarrists in Cusco after the Siege to preemptively attack the Almagrists returning from Chile.²⁴⁰ Meanwhile, in order to clear the Pizarro name, rivals like Almagro were constantly badmouthed to the Crown. Pedro Pizarro accused Francisco's former partner of many things, first and foremost of breaking a promise that would ultimately lead to the outbreak of the civil war in Peru.²⁴¹ Almagro was also said to have been embezzling treasure from the Crown's royal one-fifth and to have been responsible for the Inca Atahualpa's death.²⁴²

So much physical fighting and political backbiting made the Peruvian conquistadors easy targets to a king that did not think highly of them. This is where Titu Cusi's account of the conquest and his father's choice of rebellion is skillfully delivered to the king. It must be remembered that the following story is an account from Titu Cusi only and is full of manipulative language and propaganda; therefore, it should only be

²³⁹ Lockhart, 159-60.

²⁴⁰ Ibid, 178.

²⁴¹ Pizarro, 145.

²⁴² Ibid, 215-7.

taken as true where corroborating extant documentation is noted. The story goes that after Manco Inca requested that the Spaniards stay in his territory, his guests eventually succumbed to greed and temptation by the Devil. They orchestrated a kidnapping plot in order to extort gold and silver out of the wealthy Quechua ruler. Hernando Pizarro also demanded that he be given Manco Inca's *coya*, which would also probably resonate strongly with the king of Spain. Not only does the Catholic faith not permit unions that are not consensual but demanding Cura Ocllo, the Inca's *coya*, as ransom would be the equivalent of raping the Queen in European countries. While sovereignty was constantly impinged upon, there was an attempt to respect nobility. Titu Cusi's explanation of the first kidnapping and ransom of Manco Inca has been supported by many historical sources.²⁴³ No matter how commonly known this story was, however, it gave Titu Cusi an excellent opportunity to tell the story through one of his frequent uses of a Manco Inca monologue. These monologues touched on several key arguments for Titu Cusi's negotiations including the one of Manco Inca's generosity and loyalty that ultimately led to his own betrayal. Once the situation was resolved, special emphasis was placed on the fact that Manco Inca harbored no ill will. Titu Cusi stated that Manco Inca acted from "love, not fear." The speech that the Inca gave even absolved the king of any responsibility in the plot as he stated that if peace did not prevail then "it would greatly upset God and your king if it were to be any different."²⁴⁴ Despite this diatribe against the Spaniards who kidnapped his father, Titu Cusi emphasized that this plot was not involving Francisco Pizarro or any other Spanish officials.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ Nowack, 60.

²⁴⁴ Yupanqui, 81.

²⁴⁵ Ibid, 74-81.

The account goes on to say that there was a second and even a third kidnapping by the Pizarro brothers once each successive brother realized the wealth that the previous attempt had procured for his sibling. Gonzalo's kidnapping not only made him a wealthy man according to Titu Cusi, but he, like his brother, also demanded that Manco Inca's *coya* be given to him as a prize. Once again Manco Inca resisted, this time turning over an "Indian woman" who was dressed up to look like the *coya* and deceive Gonzalo. After the reconciliation that occurred after the second kidnapping between the Inca and Gonzalo Pizarro, Juan Pizarro then took it upon himself to make his fortune by ransoming the Tahuantinsuyu ruler.²⁴⁶ During these three kidnappings, Titu Cusi claimed that Manco Inca gave at least five monologues that bombard the reader – including his intended target, the king – with reminders of all the Inca provided for the Spaniards, claiming that they were only prosperous due to his generosity.²⁴⁷ It was after this third time that Manco Inca finally relented against these unruly brothers, emphasizing his continued loyalty to Spain and Francisco Pizarro. Even when the decision to rebel had finally been made, Titu Cusi took care to portray it as a reluctant decision that had to be made after the urging of his advisers. Since the middle of the second ransoming, Manco Inca's general, Vila Oma had been urging the Inca to allow him to destroy the Spaniards.²⁴⁸ To Manco Inca, what the Pizarro brothers had done was not only disrespectful to him but to the king. He even went so far as to portray these kidnappings – particularly that of Gonzalo Pizarro – as a rebellion not against the Inca but against the king of Spain himself.²⁴⁹ Not only did Manco Inca's repeated refusal of

²⁴⁶ Yupanqui, 86-100.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, 91, 95, 109, 112.

²⁴⁸ Ibid, 89-90, 101.

²⁴⁹ Ibid, 128.

such a request show his loyalty to Francisco Pizarro and the king of Spain but it also portrayed the Spaniards in a light that Titu Cusi was most fond of: one of helpless vulnerability. The Inca's power only seemed to be growing during this time period as well as the Toledo Reforms prompted tens of thousands of indigenous people to flee to escape the reach of Spanish control during the 1560's.²⁵⁰ Starting with Quisquis's rebellion after Atahualpa's execution, Titu Cusi made it clear that the Inca could have annihilated the conquistadors at any point that he wanted yet chose not to do so out of friendship and loyalty.

By portraying the Spaniards as powerless while aggrandizing the Inca's influence in Tahuantinsuyu, Titu Cusi played to incessant Spanish fears of revolt. Part of his argument for the legitimacy of the Manco Inca-Titu Cusi lineage was the argument of the love, fear, and respect that the Andean people had for their Inca. He claimed that the people would gladly lay down their lives for whatever the Inca wanted which portrayed them as a threat only if the Inca was not on Spain's side. Scenes like Manco Inca's request for his first ransom were common:

The generals and the other people replied in unison, "Señor Sapai Inca, that is nothing next to what we owe to you. It will be done as you command immediately." And thus they all took leave in order to get what my father had demanded from them. After a short time, they returned with the desired things, which were piled up and arranged in accordance with my father's orders.²⁵¹

Statements of the Inca's subjects' unconditional loyalty and support are not grounded in the historical record yet this statement could have been accurate. According to the Inca system of reciprocity, the ruler did not "force" his subjects to do anything. He requested favors, like that of gathering the ransom. This was because the system of political

²⁵⁰ Burkholder and Johnson, 128.

²⁵¹ Yupanqui, 78.

relations (particularly between the kurawkas and the Inca) was balanced on polite reciprocity. Yet in Tahuantinsuyu, saying “no” was an act of open rebellion which would be violently suppressed.²⁵² It is important to note that even though Titu Cusi portrayed his father as participating in egalitarian, respectful dialogue with his generals who were all too eager to acquiesce to his request, he synonymously used the words “request” and “demand.”

Nevertheless, statements of unconditional love and support in Tahuantinsuyu are incontrovertibly contained to “An Inca Account.” Tahuantinsuyu was an extremely decentralized empire and questions have even been raised as to how much influence the Inca had gained since it seems that most of their expansion had occurred less than one hundred years before the Spaniards’ arrival.²⁵³ Contrary to Titu Cusi’s claims of unwavering support, it seems much more likely that Manco Inca had to recruit soldiers to his side by force rather than courteous requests.²⁵⁴ Yet despite the fact that the Inca may not have held the amount of influence over the indigenous population that many Spaniards feared that he did in the midst of the tumultuous sixteenth century, the behavior of the conquistadors still provided easy scapegoats for Titu Cusi to pin the blame of the rebellion on. It truly took an imaginative and clever leader to claim that Manco Inca’s revolution was, in fact, *for* the king’s benefit when accounts at the time made clear that his ultimate goal was to expel all Europeans from Tahuantinsuyu.²⁵⁵ However, this was not the only tactic that the penultimate Inca would use in his carefully crafted account of the Spanish conquest: he would also appeal to the Crown on the

²⁵² Spalding, “Huarochiri,” 83.

²⁵³ Ibid, 77.

²⁵⁴ Nowack, 59.

²⁵⁵ De la Vega, 129.

grounds of royalty, chivalry, gender relations, religion, and reciprocal mercy. Due to Titu Cusi's premature death in 1571, history never saw the outcome of the Inca's plea to the Spanish monarch. However, it seems as if Titu Cusi hedged his bets against the correct conquistadors when requesting for the king to choose a side.

Chapter VII

THE NEGOTIATIONS: TITU CUSI'S ARGUMENTS FOR WHY HE DESERVED ECONOMIC GAIN INSTEAD OF PUNISHMENT

“Whether they [the Spaniards] liked it or not, a capable ruler was now in charge of Vilcabamba. The Spanish authorities were uncertain how to deal with this new situation in the native state. Some wanted to repeat the policy of enticing the Inca out of his retreat; others favoured another military expedition, despite the memory of failure by Rodrigo Orgóñez and Gonzalo Pizarro.”

- *The Conquest of the Incas*²⁵⁶

Now that Titu Cusi had established his legitimacy, secured allies, and found plausible scapegoats to absolve his father of any blame, his negotiations could now secure rewards. To do this, he could both establish positive actions by he and his father to argue for rewards and point out negative actions by Spaniards to argue for reparations. In his account to the king, Titu did both successfully. To begin, the Inca reminded the monarch repeatedly that the Spaniards were only still in South America because of his good graces. He had received unexpected corroboration when Pedro Pizarro said as much in his own history.²⁵⁷ He provided examples of unwavering support, loyalty, and compassion even long after experience had taught them otherwise. The final tale of his father's life revolves around some Spaniards who were seeking political asylum in Vilcabamba.

²⁵⁶ Hemming, 301.

²⁵⁷ Pizarro, 199.

They begged for permission to stay in his land for the remainder of their days. Although my father would hardly have been prejudiced in favor of the Spaniards by then, when he saw that they had come with good intentions, he ordered his captains not to harm them, for he wanted to protect them in his land as though they were his own offspring. They were even given houses in which they could live. Although my father's captains would have preferred to finish them off then and there, they obeyed his orders.²⁵⁸

Titu Cusi's view of his father is one of a man loving, loyal, and compassionate to an unfortunate fault: Manco Inca was murdered by these refugees that he had given asylum at Vilcabamba. Titu Cusi, for his part, was also seriously wounded in the "treacherous" attack, leaving him physically affected for the rest of his life.²⁵⁹

Beyond his generosity to the Spaniards, Manco Inca and Titu Cusi were equally portrayed as universally loved and respected by the residents of Tahuantinsuyu, a fact that would both hint at their ability to raise a crushing army as well as speak to their ability to govern or manage *encomiendas*. As argued in the previous chapter, Manco Inca did not enjoy such admiration from his subjects nor did Manco nor Titu show respect for their subjects in a humanizing fashion. In fact, it has been argued that the civil war between Atahualpa and Huáscar was not only necessary for a legitimate heir, despite Titu Cusi's claims, but that it was also necessary for Manco Inca to build up a sufficient power base to assume leadership. It should hardly be assumed that Manco Inca was the only prospective heir of Huayna Capac's fifty children to the throne after Túpac Hualpa's death. His brothers Pascac, Ynguill, Cayo Topa, and Quaipar were rival nobles who were portrayed in Titu Cusi's account as traitors who had joined the Pizarro

²⁵⁸ Yupanqui, 125.

²⁵⁹ Ibid, 125-128. In addition to eulogizing his father, the description of the scene of Manco Inca's death allowed Titu Cusi one last opportunity to argue for his legitimacy. Despite the aforementioned examples of Titu Cusi's concessions that Túpac Amaru was the legitimate heir, he dictated nearly three pages of an alleged Manco Inca deathbed speech that proclaimed Titu Cusi in charge.

brothers' (but not Spain's) cause. Yet they were all potential Inca in their own right and had the support of enough auxiliary troops to defend the Spaniards against Manco Inca's force.²⁶⁰

Despite the questionable respect that the people of Tahuantinsuyu had for the Inca, the idea of the Inca rebel leaders acting in the best interest of their subjects has become engrained in the historiography of the Andes. It seems to be a desire among historians to split the political actions of New World people into one of two camps: loyalty to the Spaniards or loyalty to the "indigenous cause." There have, as previously mentioned, been historians such as Karen Spalding who have sought to break with such a strict dichotomy by examining the social mobility and individual interests of local leaders in how it related to regional politics.²⁶¹ Indigenous rulers who relocated their *ayllus* during the time period were even said to have done so in order to protect their subjects' labor statuses.²⁶² The problem with such a paradigm is that it too often leads students of history, particularly those with a cursory knowledge of a particular subject in history, to label those who acted against the interests of other indigenous peoples as a "traitor," to use Titu Cusi's own vocabulary choice. As a leader of Vilcabamba, Titu Cusi has been lumped into the latter camp, a true leader of the indigenous fight against the Spaniards. John Hemming has been used by historians as the premier authority on Peruvian conquest history and yet his description of Titu Cusi shows a vast misunderstanding of the Inca's character when he said, "All that we know reveals him as a capable and conscientious

²⁶⁰ Nowack, 59. Titu Cusi must have been counting on Spaniards' tendency to omit the contributions of indigenous auxiliaries in their conquests. When describing the actual rebellion by Manco Inca, he continued to stage it as an overwhelming, united force against a miniscule Spanish army and did not even mention the extremely formidable auxiliary army that Cuzco had in place during the siege (but more on that later).

²⁶¹ See the previously cited Karen Spalding's "Social Climbers."

²⁶² Burkholder and Johnson, 144.

ruler.”²⁶³ He even went on to say that Titu Cusi’s “prime concern was the well-being of his subjects and the preservation of his state and dynasty.”²⁶⁴ Hemming argued that Titu Cusi adroitly adapted to Spanish hegemony in the Andes by shifting Vilcabamba’s relationship with Lima from one of confrontation to one of coexistence to, eventually, one of submission. According to his interpretation, this was done as a delay tactic (a view that most modern historiography has adapted without questioning it) which would continue to support Hemming’s view of Titu Cusi as selflessly attempting to maintain Vilcabamba’s independence for the interests of his subjects. He argued that Titu Cusi “was not tempted by the comforts of Cuzco as his brother Sayri Túpac [Saïre Topa] had been.”²⁶⁵ Other interpretations, such as Ralph Bauer’s introduction to the *relación*, do not laud Titu Cusi’s selfless rule but do continue to argue that the manipulations exercised on the Spaniards were merely a delay tactic to preserve Vilcabamba’s existence. Yet despite arguments that desire to place the rebels Manco Inca and Titu Cusi as admirable leaders of Indian resistance, evidence continues to mount that suggest that the Incas had little, if any, connection to their subjects. Manco Inca’s cruelty against his subjects was so excessive that it ultimately alienated him from his former supporters and thereby contributed to his defeat.²⁶⁶ The top position that Manco Inca held among Tahuantinsuyu’s classes shaped his perception that held little regard for those in lower strata. When Gonzalo requested Manco Inca’s *coya* during his second kidnapping, the ruler instead tricked the conquistador by giving him an Indian woman who was dressed to appear like the *coya*. If any questions were to remain about the Indian’s willingness to

²⁶³ Hemming, 333. Hemming is largely responsible for the perception of Inca rebels acting in the best interests of their subjects. Subsequent historical accounts of the period usually refer to Hemming in their description of the Vilcabamba rulers.

²⁶⁴ Ibid, 334.

²⁶⁵ Ibid, 337-339.

²⁶⁶ Nowack, 60.

participate in such a ruse in order to save Manco Inca's true wife from captivity, they are laid to rest by Titu Cusi's own account after Gonzalo asked if she was "for him":

And my father, who had initiated her well, said, "Very well then, do what you desire." And so, before everyone's eyes and without seeing anything else, he went up to her in order to kiss and embrace her as though she were his legitimate wife. This made my father laugh and the others wonder, while it greatly terrified and appalled Ynguill. As she saw herself being grabbed by a man whom she did not even know, she began screaming like a mad person, saying that she did not want to give herself to such people, that she would rather run away, and that on no account would she have them.²⁶⁷

While this behavior may not have been any different than what a European ruler would have done when put in this situation, his laughter and contempt at the woman's terror belied his compassionate façade. Titu was making an appeal to the Spanish honor-based culture.²⁶⁸ The account even goes on to say that when he saw how much this situation bothered her, he "furiously ordered her that she should go with them."²⁶⁹ Not even once does Titu Cusi or Manco Inca identify with the people that they rule. Titu Cusi usually refers to the citizens of Tahuantinsuyu as "these Indians," a term that, for Titu Cusi, seems to describe them as a separate – and lesser – people than his own.²⁷⁰ Atahualpa even compared Hernando Pizarro to an Inca due to his extreme contempt for subordinates.²⁷¹ Phillip Ainsworth Means also noted a considerable isolation by the Incas from their subjects when he stated, "As time went on, however, they developed a dynastic haughtiness, a quaint tribal snobbishness, which caused them to hold themselves aloof from and vastly superior to even the highest of vassals."²⁷² Incas frequently used cultural warfare against their own subjects in order to terrify them into submission.

²⁶⁷ Yupanqui, 96.

²⁶⁸ Burkholder and Johnson, 245.

²⁶⁹ Yupanqui, 97.

²⁷⁰ Ibid, 72, 87, 92, 99.

²⁷¹ MacQuarrie, 272.

²⁷² Means, 30.

During the civil war between Atahualpa and Huáscar, the two leaders would destroy the *huacas* of uncooperative subjects. Atahualpa was, of course, known for his cruel behavior like slaughtering the men, women, and children who had fought or torturing political enemies so badly that they jumped at the chance to join the conquistadors.²⁷³ He is also said to have lost an ear during the attempted rape of a Quechua commoner, a woman who fought back by grabbing his ear and ripping it cleanly off of his head.²⁷⁴ Huáscar, on the other hand, made a habit of destroying the ties that locals had to the land by burning or otherwise destroying “bundles,” mummy-like corpses of admirable historical leaders that Huáscar claimed was taking up valuable land.²⁷⁵ In addition, contrary to Hemming’s view of Titu Cusi as someone who was always working for his subjects’ best interests, it is worth noting that while his predecessors, Manco Inca and Sayri Túpac, included provisions for their subjects in the peace negotiations with the Spanish, Titu Cusi failed to do so. Sayri Túpac not only worked to obtain amnesty for his supporters at Vilcabamba but actually secured them their own *encomiendas*. Yet when Titu Cusi signed the *Capitulación de Acobamba* in 1566, his followers were noticeably absent.²⁷⁶

Another subject of Titu Cusi’s life and account that has come under scrutiny by historians is his baptism and conversion to Catholicism shortly after the Capitulation of Acobamba. Many saw this gesture as insincere at best since Titu Cusi never abolished indigenous religions or practices during his reign.²⁷⁷ It is usually attributed as another delay tactic because of the paradigm created by John Hemming yet the historians that

²⁷³ Pizarro, 177.

²⁷⁴ Betanzos, 212.

²⁷⁵ Pizarro, 205-6.

²⁷⁶ Nowack, 73.

²⁷⁷ Bauer.

dismiss it as such are ignoring the more important part of his conversion. However, indigenous peoples of the Andes had been using Christian concepts to pacify priests long before Titu Cusi thought to do so. For example, the Jesuit priest Blas Valera had been told by Quechuas that the Antis walked in the forest and spoke with the devil, represented by a serpent.²⁷⁸ But the appeal to Christianity in this case was yet another skillful manipulation of Spaniards by Titu Cusi, not just by garnering sympathy as a neophyte believer instead of a pagan noble. His conversion into Christianity allowed Titu Cusi more knowledge from which he framed his arguments; his role as a marginal member of Spanish Peru was secured by allowing both Christianity and Andean traditions to persist until his death. The first time he invoked a Catholic virtue in order to appeal to Spanish senses in his account was when he was discussing the ultimate fate of the *coya* Cura Ocllo, whom Gonzalo thought he had obtained during the second ransoming of Manco Inca. While the actual fate of Cura Ocllo states that she was held hostage by Francisco Pizarro himself and subsequently executed, Titu Cusi could not include that in his *relación*, either because he was not aware of such developments or, more likely, because he could not criticize the man with whom he claimed to have such close family ties.²⁷⁹ Instead, Titu Cusi claimed that she was kidnapped during the burial of one of her brothers. After being forced to return to Cuzco, Cura Ocllo was then subjected to horrible treatment.

They arrived with my aunt at the town of Pampaconac, where they tried to rape her. But she did not want to let this happen and defended herself bravely to the bitter end, even covering her body with stinking and filthy things in order to disgust those who wanted to touch her. Thusly she defended herself innumerable times until they arrived at the town of Tambo, where the Spaniards, who were very angry because my aunt

²⁷⁸ De la Vega, 33.

²⁷⁹ Nowack, 59.

would not permit what they desired and because she was my father's sister, shot her with arrows.²⁸⁰

Oddly enough, the importance of this story is not the attempted rape itself. This is not the first time Titu Cusi relayed the tale of Spaniards' sexual deviance and, while important to emphasize who the antagonists were in his tale, it is usually glossed over quickly.

However, the importance of the tale lies with the martyrdom of Cura Ocllo for virtues that Spaniards would find truly admirable in any human, especially an Indian. He stated that "for the sake of chastity, she endured it all[...]"²⁸¹ Titu Cusi's appeal to Christian virtues was a strong one because Cura Ocllo was not simply resisting sexual temptation; she endured torture and eventual death in order to maintain what they would consider her body's purity.

In addition to emphasizing Manco Inca's bravery and valor on the battlefield – traits that the Spaniards would no doubt recognize and respect – Titu Cusi also shrewdly exploited religion in his description of the rebellion itself. His emphasis during the rebellion is, of course, on the overwhelming numbers that Manco Inca was able to assemble for the siege of Cuzco. He placed the number of troops surrounding the city at 400,000, a number debated by many historians but almost certainly was at least over 100,000.²⁸² In addition, Manco Inca's general, Vila Oma, laid siege to the city by flooding the surrounding fields rather than attempt a direct attack. Flaming rocks were launched onto roofs in Cuzco, leaving the Spaniards with no quarter. Blaming Manco Inca's army for not successfully eliminating the Spaniards would have left Titu Cusi's account feeling very dark and cruel but crediting the Spaniards with superior military

²⁸⁰ Yupanqui, 123.

²⁸¹ Ibid, 124.

²⁸² Hemming, 191.

tactics would have surrendered one of Titu Cusi's most valuable arguments in his negotiations of a superior yet compassionate Inca military that chose not to eliminate the king's subjects. Instead, Titu Cusi strategically chose another explanation for Spain's perseverance through the onslaught: Divine Favor.²⁸³ It is acknowledged that Titu Cusi surrendered political authority to the king and claimed submission to him in the account.²⁸⁴ However, it has not been considered that these arguments – the superiority of Christianity in the dealings of the two distinctly different empires as well as the acknowledgement by Titu Cusi that everything Spain had done was not to control him politically or socially but to save his soul – were Titu Cusi's subtle way of surrendering spiritual authority to the head of the Church in Spain: the Crown itself. Mandating that the hundreds of people at Vilcabamba convert was not required in negotiations so Titu Cusi did not ban Andean practices. Yet his own baptism and the fact that he permitted Spanish missionaries to live among them were good faith gestures made to a Catholic monarch on the other side of the ocean, not a delay tactic. There is also some evidence that has suggested that Andeans truly did have respect for Christianity outside of its political value. The mestizo Inca Garcilaso de la Vega claimed that it was St. James who saved the Spaniards during the Siege of Cusco, a common belief at the time. He also claimed that Manco Inca did not believe that the less than two hundred Spaniards were strong enough to repel his troops; Manco believed he had been defeated by the Christian God, not the conquistadors.²⁸⁵ In addition, some similarities in Andean and European religiosity allowed some common ground to be found. For example, to the Incas, the very first *coya*, Mama Waco, is as important to the spirituality of the Andes as the creator

²⁸³ Yupanqui, 107-114.

²⁸⁴ Ibid, 135.

²⁸⁵ De la Vega, 127-30.

himself. It was Mama Waco, born of the moon and the sun, who gave birth to the principle god of the Incas and, therefore, made the mother of “god” worthy of worship. Historians have for too long focused on the wrong part of his conversion; whether or not he was sincerely born-again is irrelevant. It is only important if these facts appealed to the king’s spiritual side, a fact that also remains unclear due to Titu Cusi’s untimely death.

Current questions on the sincerity of the Inca’s negotiations with the Spaniards, including his conversion and his account of the Spanish conquest, typically tend to revolve around the premise that Titu Cusi recognized his own military and political limitations and was, therefore, attempting to stall negotiations in order to preserve Vilcabamba’s independence.²⁸⁶ Some of the examples used for evidence to support such assumptions were the late requests made by Titu Cusi when the two sides were at the brink of an agreement. To these historians, the last-minute requests were a delay tactic, rather than being regarded as a great opportunity for leverage. This thesis has ignored the tremendous concessions Titu Cusi was willing to make in negotiations as well as the extent to which he went in order to establish himself as the rightful Inca for negotiations. A stall could have easily used every member of Vilcabamba society as a negotiating tool, requiring the Spaniards to address several channels before coming to a peace accord. This would have been perfectly reasonable during this time period as it has been noted that during Titu Cusi and Túpac Amaru’s reigns there were “more leaders than

²⁸⁶ See Bauer, Hemming’s *The Conquest of the Incas*, London: Macmillan, 1970, and Kerstin Nowack’s “*Las Mercedes que pedía para su salida: The Vilcabamba Inca and the Spanish State, 1539-1572*,” In *New World, First Nations: Native Peoples of Mesoamerica and the Andes Under Colonial Rule*, eds. David Cahill and Blanca Tovías, Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2006.

followers.”²⁸⁷ It is worth noting that Manco Inca’s negotiations included provisions for his followers as did Sayri Túpac’s negotiations.²⁸⁸ This is important because once agreements had been reached for the Incas themselves, then a whole new set of negotiations would have had to have been entered in order to work out provisions for the several hundred indigenous people at Vilcabamba and Vitcos.²⁸⁹ However, Titu Cusi did not enter negotiations on behalf of the other “Inca refugees.” The negotiations were done himself as he went out of his way to establish himself as the lone authority for negotiations and while they were not undertaken with particular haste, neither did he procrastinate in fulfilling portions of his capitulation such as the arranged marriage of his son and niece or his son’s baptism. By establishing himself as the sole power for discussions, he both increased the effectiveness of said negotiations (and, therefore, shortened their duration) and augmented his prospective returns.

²⁸⁷ Nowack, 74.

²⁸⁸ Ibid, 65-67.

²⁸⁹ Vitcos was the royal settlement of the Inca rebellion. Manco Inca perceived the tropical lowlands that housed Vilcabamba as inhospitable. He, therefore, used the nearby city of Vitcos in what he considered a more tolerable environment as it was higher up in the mountains. It is unclear if he built the city or if Pachacuti had built it previously but it is likely that it had already been built as Titu Cusi describes it as the place where the Inca ancestors had been buried.

Chapter VIII

THE CONCLUSIONS: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT TITU CUSI AND THE FUTURE OF VILCABAMBA STUDY

The hole in historiography on Titu Cusi's historical account of the conquest and his reign can possibly be attributed to the relative lack of "historical action" that took place while Titu Cusi Yupanqui was Inca. There is ample work that has been done on Huayna Capac, considered the greatest of the Inca dynasty. Much scholarship has been written on Huáscar and Atahualpa due to the civil war that engulfed Tahuantinsuyu which coincided with Pizarro's arrival. There is also plenty of research that has been done on Manco Inca, Titu Cusi's father and leader of the indigenous rebellion against the Spaniards. Túpac Amaru is even better known than his elder brother despite the fact that his reign lasted only a year.²⁹⁰ This is not due to historiography that paints the ultimate Inca of the Andes as a great inspiration or failure but merely as the current ruler when the "Inca Empire" finally fell. By contrast, Titu Cusi's decade-long reign that preserved the state was uneventful as neither great gains nor losses were sustained during his time as Inca.

An Inca Account of the Conquest of Peru offered arguments for legitimacy, loyalty, and service. It attempted to prove that Spain – and by consequence, the Crown – only profited in South America due to the good graces of Manco Inca and Titu Cusi. The

²⁹⁰ Kenneth Andrien, *Andean Worlds* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2001).

rebellion by his father was minimized by offering up a scapegoat: the politically unpopular Pizarro brothers while maintaining the Inca's commitment to the higher authorities in Europe. The king was reminded of Titu Cusi's conversion to Catholicism, as well as his son's, and the strict manner in which he obeyed this new religion when he said, "Moreover, this is the manner in which I have hitherto kept – and am still keeping – the Christian faith."²⁹¹ It has been argued by many that the negotiations that Titu Cusi often initiated were merely a delay tactic despite the acknowledgement by some of these same historians that an imminent threat to Vilcabamba, especially in the form of a war from the Spaniards, was essentially nonexistent. The attempts at peace with Vilcabamba, as well as the lack of an offensive by Spain, lasted for decades and by the time of Titu Cusi's reign, a noticeable shift had occurred in the policy of the Europeans. In 1567, just a few years before *An Inca Account* was written and delivered and years after Titu Cusi's reign had begun, it was claimed that Spain could not "make war on the Inca with a clear conscience, because he has responded that he wants peace."²⁹² It was not even necessary for Titu Cusi to cease hostilities in order to avoid Spanish reprisals and ensure Vilcabamba's continued existence as the raids by Vilcabamba's inhabitants continued throughout Titu Cusi's reign unchecked and were, evidently, not important in the idea that Titu Cusi wanted peace.²⁹³ The flaunting of his blatant disregard for Spanish law and order even extended to Titu Cusi's own *relación*, where he reminded the king that "[Titu Cusi] continuously made raiding expeditions into their lands and abducted a great number of the inhabitants."²⁹⁴

²⁹¹ Yupanqui, 132-133.

²⁹² Nowack, 63-64.

²⁹³ Ibid, 64.

²⁹⁴ Yupanqui, 130.

In short, the negotiations were not about Titu Cusi protecting his subjects from Spanish offensives as he continually showed contempt and disregard for his Quechua and Anti followers. They were also not his attempt to record an indigenous account of the Spanish conquest, to examine the rough edges that the Spaniards had glossed over. Titu Cusi himself glossed over many of these heinous acts in order to strengthen his connection to the Spanish king; he, too, saw most of the acts by the Spanish as justifiable, including their rule in Cuzco and execution of Atahualpa. Instead, they were Titu Cusi's attempt to renegotiate himself back into Cuzco society, exempt from tribute, influential over more than just the four hundred residents of Vilcabamba, and wealthy once again. He requested the concession to populate villages in the valley of Amaybamba, a plot and fields in Cuzco, the *encomienda* formerly held by the monastery of La Merced in Cuzco, the small *encomiendas* of Cachona and Canaroa near Cuzco, the Vilcabamba region in *encomienda*, the *encomienda* formerly held by the cathedral of Cuzco, and a rent of 2,000 *pesos* from the income of his daughter-in-law's *encomiendas* plus 3,000 more for the tutorship and *encomienda* obligations of said daughter-in-law.²⁹⁵ Despite such requests, many have argued that his continual additions to his requests are proof of his attempts to delay a peace treaty, yet he signed one in 1566. Instead, it is necessary to see this as Diego de Castro Titu Cusi Yupanqui's exploitation of leverage over what he saw as an increasingly desperate Spanish empire. They offered pardons and land to Manco Inca, despite having already distributed said land as *encomiendas*. They were willing to offer the richest *encomiendas* in Peru to Sayri Túpac and his descendants then take them away in order to offer them to Titu Cusi to sweeten the offer.²⁹⁶ Despite claims that "Titu Cusi

²⁹⁵ Nowack, 88.

²⁹⁶ Ibid, 65-76.

was not tempted by the comforts of Cuzco as his brother Sayri-Túpac [Saire Topa] had been,”²⁹⁷ it is more likely that Titu Cusi witnessed Spanish negotiators so desperate for peace that they permitted the marriage of Sayri Túpac and his sister.²⁹⁸ It is wise to question Titu Cusi’s sincerity but a narrow view to see him as a noble Andean struggling to preserve his peoples’ society.

There is great potential in further study about Titu Cusi and the Indians at Vilcabamba. The ideal situation would be a New Philological study if Quechua-language documents written in the Latin alphabet, if such documents exist. If so, it will, of course, be necessary to be pursued by a scholar who is fluent in the language as much of indigenous accounts is already lost in translation. Beyond the scope of Quechua documents, the colonial archives – particularly that of Lima – are filled with sources that have yet to be examined and the letters between Lope García de Castro and Titu Cusi Yupanqui have yet to be published for a personal view of how political negotiations can turn into hegemonic negotiation. Furthermore, the field of rebellion is noticeably lacking in its social histories. What were the lives of the rebels at Vilcabamba like? Was it a considerable change from life in their *ayllus*? Is there a comparison that can be drawn between the various rebels of the sixteenth century in Peru? Were Titu Cusi’s Indians motivated by the same grievances as Lope de Aguirre’s Indians? In regards to Titu Cusi’s secret arms factory, were there even more plots than we know about? Discovery of a larger plan could change the whole perspective of diplomatic relations between Vilcabamba and Peru. And finally, what were the lives of women like under rebel conditions? Did it vary based on the stability of the period? Were there any Spaniards or

²⁹⁷ Hemming, 339.

²⁹⁸ Nowack, 67.

Africans that joined the rebel cause, whose identities were allowed to be fluid enough that it has made recognition difficult? Obviously, all of these suggestions could only be examined in a perfect world with sufficient documentation for everything. However, the field is far from complete and forty years of accepting the common paradigm on the Vilcabamba Inca has left a considerable hole in historiography that will hopefully be filled in the near future.

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Glossary of Quechua and Spanish Terms Used

Acllawasi – “House of the Chosen Women.” A chamber of the Inca’s administration, the house was filled with *acllas*, chosen women who were required to be virgins. These women performed various duties such as concubinage, domestic service, or the directed worship of individual *huacas*.

Ayllu – The basic Andean kinship network. Ayllus also generally participated in “vertical archipelago economies,” trading with other ayllus up and down the mountainside.

Conquistador – A conqueror. A Spanish soldier, usually an amateur.

Costumbre – Local custom.

Coya – “Sister-wife.” The *coya* was the Inca’s principal wife but one could only be a *coya* if she was a full sibling to the Inca in order to maintain “blood purity.”

Encomienda – A grant of Indian labor. The holder of such a grant was known as an *encomendero(a)*.

Huacas – Usually stones, *huacas* were items of worship the the Andes. These *huacas* could represent specific deities or ancestors.

Inca – “One of royal blood.” A male with royal blood.

Kuraka – A local leader.

Mestizo – A person of mixed race heritage, of both indigenous and Spanish descent.

Orejones – A type of Incan warrior that received its name due to its typically pierced ears and ear plugs.

Palla – “One of royal blood.” A female with royal blood.

Quechua (Kichwa) – Both an ethnicity of indigenous peoples in the Andes and the common trade language of Tahuantinsuyu.

Quipu (or khipu) – A system of knotted cords used in the Andes in place of a written alphabet. Quipus were used to keep count of days, bureaucratic records, and to keep track of storage.

Reconquista – The reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula by the Spanish against the Moors.

Relación – An account.

Tahuantinsuyu – “Land of Four Quarters,” or the Inca Empire.

Viracocha – “Lord,” in Quechua. Also, it came to become synonymous with “Spaniard.”